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CRIMINAL LAW
RACISM, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC JURY: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF A DELICATE
BALANCE
BRIAN J. SERR*
MARK IANEY* *
The institution of the jury may be aristocratic or democratic, according
to the class from which the jurors are taken; but it always preserves its
republican character, in that it places the real direction of society in
the hands of the governed, or of a portion of the governed, and not in
The true sanction of political laws is to be
that of government ....
found in penal legislation. He who punishes the criminal is therefore
the real master of society. Now, the institution of the jury raises the
people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the bench ofjudges...
[and] consequently invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the
direction of society.... In the United States the [jury] system is applied to the whole people. [It applies to] every American citizen [who
is] both an eligible and legally qualified voter. The jury system as it is
understood in America appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a
consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.
They are two instruments of equal power .... I
Alexis de Tocqueville's antebellum description of the American
criminal jury as a democratic institution equalled only by universal
suffrage 2 was necessarily premised on American society at that time.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. L.L.M., University of

Illinois School of Law, 1985; J.D., Washington University-St. Louis, 1984; B.S., Dana
College, 1981.
** J.D., Baylor University School of Law, 1987.
1

A.

DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83 (Knopf 1951)(footnotes

omitted).

2 See also Carter v.Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)("Whether jury service be deemed a right, privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of
its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in
the offering and withholding of the elective franchise.").
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"Every American citizen" was synonymous with white males.3 Suffrage and political participation for all white males was, at that time,
a progressive democratic ideal and contrasted favorably with the
4
aristocratic republic in England.
After the Civil War, as the government granted civil rights to
the emancipated, racism clashed with the concept of extending jury
service and suffrage to all citizens. Efforts at preventing the political
participation of black persons ranged from the overt to the subtle. 5
Today, racist barriers to suffrage are largely historical. Unfortunately, Tocqueville's second bastion of democracy, the jury, remains
6
a largely racist institution.
The Supreme Court's most recent effort to remove racism from
the jury selection system, Batson v. Kentucky, 7 follows a line of cases a
century old, all attempting the same difficult feat-the creation of a
color-blind jury selection system.8 The task is enormously difficult
because racism is, especially in contemporary America, subtle and
often unconscious. The protections against racism, therefore, are
generally cumbersome and unwieldy, threatening venerable institutions such as the peremptory challenge in Batson. Because peremptory challenges inherently accomodate racism by sanctioning
unexplained, subjective decisions, combatting racism in jury selection will necessarily threaten time-honored prosecutorial liberties.
Batson, however, attempted the difficult task of eliminating racial discrimination without sacrificing the historic role of the peremptory
challenge.
Now, almost two years after the Batson decision, it is time to
comment on its success or failure. With racism still pervasive in our
society, is it possible to successfully accommodate both the arbitrary
peremptory challenge and the ideal of a democratic jury? Has the
Supreme Court, in its effort to accommodate both interests, gone
too far in a futile attempt to eliminate racism from jury selection,
inhibiting only the prosecutor's right to freely select a jury, with no
corresponding return in the elimination of racism? Or, has the
Supreme Court, fearful of abrogating the role of the peremptory
challenge, sanctioned racism in the courtroom? These questions
3 Tocqueville chronicled what he viewed as the irreconcilable clash between "three
races in the United States"-whites, Indians, and blacks. See A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
1, at 381-484.
4 Id. at 283.
5 See infra notes 9-33 and accompanying text.
6 See generally Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611
(1985).
7 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8 See infra notes 9-39 and accompanying text.
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can be answered only if one has an understanding of Batson's historical role, its eighteen-month history, and the attempted balance of
important interests which shaped its remedy.

I.
A.

RACISM AND JURY SELECTION

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:

SELECTING THE VENIRE

The Supreme Court first addressed racism in jury selection in
its 1879 decision of Strauder v. West Virginia.9 The Court declared
unconstitutional a West Virginia statute limiting jury service to
"white males who are [at least] twenty-one years of age." 10 Exclusion of all black persons from jury service, the Court held, violated
the equal protection rights of a black defendant because the "very
idea of a jury is a body.., composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellow associates, [and] persons having the same
legal status in society as that which he holds.""1 The Court stated
that the equal protection clause established the right to a jury of
peers and thus precluded the systematic exclusion from jury service
of any race or class of persons.1 2 More than one hundred years
later, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court reviewed the history
of jury selection and emphasized that it had never questioned the
principles announced in Strauder.13 Rather, the Court repeatedly
14
has had to enforce those principles against various attacks.
Because Strauder prohibited only direct statutory exclusion of
blacks from venires, the Court soon had to review the discretionary
aspects of the venire selection process. Those who wished to disenfranchise blacks from the judicial process had begun to use available
subjective criteria to effectuate racist exclusion. Unfortunately, such
subtle exclusion was inherently more difficult to isolate and address.
Therefore, the removal of this subtle barrier to a truly democratic
jury required the Court's constant attention in a long line of decisions. In Neal v. Delaware,1 5 decided two years after Strauder, a black
9
10
11
12

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Id. at 305 (citation omitted).
Id. at 308, cited in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 86.
Id.

13 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986).
14 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 622-24 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 550-59 (1979); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-500 (1977); Alexander

v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50
(1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129,
133 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
370, 394 (1881).

15 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
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man alleged that Delaware's practice of selecting from lists of qualified taxpayers "sober and judicious" persons to serve as venirepersons had, in practice, systematically excluded blacks from venire
panels. 16 The Court, in an opinion written by justice Harlan, found
the state's explanation of the exclusion-that few blacks in Delaware
were intelligent or moral enough to serve as jurors-a "violent presumption," 17 especially in light of Delaware's concession that no
black had been on a venire in recent memory.' 8 This longstanding
exclusion of blacks raised a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, shifting the burden ofjustifying the total lack of black representation to the state. 19 Not surprisingly, the Court found
Delaware's explanation totally inadequate and held that Neal had
20
proved intentional discrimination.
State legislators and courts seemed reluctant to apply the protections outlined in Strauder and Neal. This resistance forced the
2
Supreme Court to address both the absolute statutory exclusion '
and discretionary exclusion 22 of blacks from grand juries. In many
cases, the Court reviewed purely factual applications of the Neal proId. at 372.
Id. at 397. The Court stated:
It was, we think, under all the circumstances, a violent presumption which the State
court indulged, that such uniform exclusion of that race from juries, during a period
of many years, was solely because, in the judgement of those officers, fairly exercised, the black race in Delaware were utterly disqualified, by want of intelligence,
experience or moral integrity, to sit on juries.
16
17

Id.
The ChiefJustice of the Delaware Supreme Court had concluded "'that none but white
men were selected is in nowise remarkable in view of the fact-too notorious to be ignored-that the great body of black men residing in this State are utterly unqualified by
want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity to sit on juries.' " Id. at 393-94.
18 Id. at 393. The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of the use of subjective
means to exclude blacks from the venire in two companion cases to Strauder: Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). These cases,
however, focused primarily on the scope of the fourteenth amendment and the power of
congress to enforce it.
19 Neal, 103 U.S. at 397.
20 Id. at 393.

Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 116 (1882).
22 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1934); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319
(1905); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1903); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442,447
(1899); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591-92 (1895). The Court in Carter made
the oft-quoted statement:
Whenever by any action of a State, whether through its legislature, through the
courts, or through its executive or administrative officers, all persons of the African
race are excluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors
in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of
the laws is denied to him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Carter, 177 U.S. at 447 (citations omitted).
21
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tections. Thus, in Norris v. Alabama,23 the Court found that the complete lack of minority representation on grand juries over many
years established a prima facie case of discrimination. 24 Proof of the
exclusion of particularly qualified blacks, including members of
school boards, trustees of segregated schools, and property owners,
bolstered this finding. 25 The Court reviewed the state's evidence,
which consisted largely of a general denial of discrimination, and
concluded that the state failed to rebut the strong inference of intentional discrimination raised by the defendant. 26 Importantly, this
conclusion directly contradicted the Alabama Supreme Court's own
factual determination, 2 7 demonstrating both the resistance facing
the Court and the effort it was willing to make in order to create a
democratic jury.
State resistance to the Strauder principles, however, was entrenched, necessitating continued federal judicial enforcement of
the equal protection principles first announced in 1879.28 The
Supreme Court soon refined its equal protection analysis and extended it beyond patently racist exclusion to include jury selection
practices which were indifferent to minority juror participation. For
example, in Hill v. Texas, 2 9 the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the long-standing practice of allowing jury commissioners to
choose jurors from among their personal acquaintances. Apparently, the commissioners were not acquainted with any black persons.3 0 There was, however, no indication that the discrimination
was intentional.3 ' Rather, the Court based its finding of an equal
protection violation on the commissioners' lack of "effort to ascertain whether there were ...members of the colored race qualified to
23 294 U.S. 587.
24 Id. at 591. The Court stated:
It appeared that no negro had served on any grand or petit jury in that county
within the memory of witnesses who had lived there all their lives. Testimony to
that effect was given by men whose ages ran from fifty to seventy-six years.... The
court reporter, who had not missed a session in that county in twenty-five years, and
two jury commissioners testified to the same effect.

Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 598. The State's evidence consisted of the testimony ofjury commissioners
who denied that race was a factor in grand jury selection and asserted that they excluded
blacks because blacks lacked the necessary qualifications. Id. at 594-95.
27 Id. at 595-96.
28 See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403 (1944); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130

(1940).
29 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
30 Id. at 403-04.
31 Id. at 404.
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serve as jurors, and if so who they were."'3 2 Thus, the decision in
Hill imposed an affirmative duty to place qualified minorities on venire panels. The Court refused to allow its goal of ajury of peers to
be sacrificed through indifference. Later, in Cassell v. Texas, 33 the
Court enlarged the duty created in Hill by striking down tokenism,
thereby transforming the goal into total absence of discrimination.
Originally, the goal of ajury of one's peers found support in the
equal protection clause and its command to eliminate intentional
racial discrimination. By the 1970s, however, the Strauder goal had
become the benefactor of a completely different constitutional provision-the sixth amendment right to trial by jury and its essential
component, the right to have a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.3 4 As the Court moved away from the equal
protection analysis, the fair cross-section requirement evolved into
32 Id. at 404-06.
33 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1949).

See also id. at 293-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34 The command of representativeness and cross-sectionality in venire panels
originated in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). The unanimous Smith Court declared: "It is part of the established tradition in the use ofjuries as instruments of public
justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." Id. at 130. To
exclude entire racial groups from jury service, the Court continued, "is at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government." Id. Following
Smith, a representative jury changed from a goal to a requirement, so that in Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1979), which dealt with exclusion of women from jury
service, the Court stated: "[T]he unmistakable impact of this Court's opinions, at least
since 1980, Smith v. Texas, and not repudiated by intervening decisions, is that selection
of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." The Court continued:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make
available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not
provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if
large distinctive groups are exluded from the pool. Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system. Restrictingjury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the
constitutional concept ofjury trial.
Id. at 530. See also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.

482 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
The Court has never prescribed specific venire selection procedures. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1979)("The fair cross-section principle must have much
leeway in application. The States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications of their
jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may fairly be said that the jury
lists are representative of the community.")(citations omitted). The Court's decisions,
however, have made random venire selection the common state practice. See NATIONAL
JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUE § 5.03(2), at 5-15 to -16 (2d ed. 1986).

A federal statute has mandated random venire selection in federal courts since 1968.
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1985).

1988]

RACISM & PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

the sole source of protection for the defendant's interest in ajury of
peers. Not until Batson did the Court revitalize the concept of reaching the goal of a jury of peers by means of the equal protection
clause.3 5 The Court, however, has applied the sixth amendment fair
cross-section requirement only to the venire, and never to the jury
36
itself.
The importance of the democratic jury-a jury of peers-cannot be overstated. Sociological study has substantiated the theoretical basis of the right which dates back to the Magna Carta: the peers
of a criminal defendant will better understand and empathize with
his feelings, social position, and needs than will those from different
backgrounds.3 7 Unconstitutional jury selection procedures not only
reduce the likelihood of obtaining a jury of one's peers, they also
cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process by creating
the appearance of bias in individual cases, and, more importantly,
by increasing the risk of actual bias.3 8 Yet, despite this critical importance, the Supreme Court has never suggested that a defendant
has a right to ajury composed in part of persons of defendant's own
race. Only a color-blind, rather than a color-conscious, selection
process 9 can fully protect the values discussed in Strauder. A true
jury of peers is, however, certainly a goal of the application of equal
protection rights to jury selection procedures; and it is a goal which
Strauder and its progeny furthered by attempting to eliminate racial
discrimination in the selection of the venire.
B.

THE PECULIAR PROBLEM OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Peremptory challenges or strikes-"challenges without cause,
without explanation and without judicial scrutiny"4 0 -can transform
even a representative venire into a white, middle-class jury. Because
35 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36 In Strauder, the Court limited its inquiry to whether the systematic exclusion of one
race violated equal protection, while distinguishing a "right to a grand or petit jury composed in whole or in part of [the defendant's] race or color ... ." Strauder, 100 U.S. at
305. The Court explicitly recognized that a defendant has no right to a "petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race." Id. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.

37 "There is extensive sociological data indicating that peers of a criminal defendant
... will vote differently from nonpeers, probably because they understand much more
about the defendant's ... feelings, attitudes, and way of life than do jurors from other
social strata." I A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS § 2.2, at 64

(1984). See also Bermant & Shepard, The Voir Dire Examination, Challenges, and Adversary
Advocacy, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 69-114 (B. Sales ed. 1981); Monahan & Loftus, The
Psychology of the Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441 (1982).

38 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1971).
39 See supra note 36.
40 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).

SERR AND MANEY

[Vol. 79

peremptory challenges allow both the prosecutor and the defendant
to strike a prospective juror at whim, they provide ample opportunity to discriminate. A racially discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes can render meaningless the protections provided to the venire selection process by Strauder and its progeny.
The very nature of the peremptory challenge is at odds with a
jury of peers. While a peer jury ideally consists of a body of the
defendant's neighbors, associates, and persons sharing a common
background and social status, 4 1 the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges, even under contemporary systematic jury selection techniques, is directed at the removal of those venirepersons who are
42
most likely to share defendant's attitudes, values, and experiences.
Therefore, the closer the similarity between a prospective juror and
the defendant, the more likely the prosecutor will strike the juror.
Traditionally, lawyers based their peremptory strikes on stereotypes
43
and obvious similarities between venirepersons and defendants.
"Boots, bellies, and tattoos" are what one DWI defense lawyer looks
for in a jury. 4 4 Today, modem demographic surveys have refined
those stereotypes and, arguably, replaced broad stereotypes with
known statistical relationships. 4 5 Still, the key factors in the use of
both traditional stereotypes and modem demographics include sex,
46
occupation, age, and, of course, race.
Another factor prevalent injury selection is the simple gut reaction of an attomey to a particular venireperson. An attorney who
for any reason feels uncomfortable with a particular juror, or feels
more comfortable with another, is likely to strike the venireperson
who causes the discomfort. It is not surprising that the scarcity of
minority jurors mirrors the paucity of minority prosecutors. Just as
voir dire works on the assumption that defendants and jurors of
similar backgrounds are likely to share basic views about life, the
same principle applies to a prosecutor's gut reactions to prospective
jurors-he is likely to be most comfortable with persons like himself.4 7 A white prosecutor's preference for jurors of his own race,
41 See id.
42 NationalJury Project, JuRYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 11.02 (3)(6)(i), at 118 (2d ed. 1986).
43 Id. ("For example, most criminal defense lawyers believe that blacks and young
people are more favorable to the defense than whites and older people."). Likewise, a
few prosecutors share the same prejudice.
44 Timms & McGonigle, PickingJuries Is An Inexact Science, Lawyers Say, Dallas Morning
News, Mar. 9, 1986, at A29, col. 1.
45 National Jury Project, supra note 42, § 11.02 (3)(6)(i), at 11-8.
46 Id. at § 11.02(4), at 11-13 to -14.
47 Justice Marshall, in his Batson concurrence, stated:
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however, is no less racial discrimination than a specific prejudice
against blacks. Peremptory exclusion on this basis both reduces minority participation on criminal juries and frustrates the interest of
minority defendants in a jury of peers. Though in some cases a
prosecutor might wish to strike white, middle-class venirepersons, it
is unlikely, due to their majority status, that he could eliminate all
persons of this class. Peremptories are likely to effectuate the total
exclusion of a class only when the lawyer aims them at minority
groups. Thus, in cases involving minorities, the very nature of peremptories conflicts with the Strauder goal of ajury of peers, as well as
with the vital interest of a minority group in directing society via
participation on criminal juries.
The Supreme Court first addressed the inherent tension between peremptory challenges and the goal of a representative jury
in Swain v. Alabama.48 The Court evidently approached the dilemma
with reluctance, as implied by the opinion's date, 1965, a full eightysix years after Strauder. The conflict between the defendant's right
to equal protection and the prosecutor's right to use peremptories
appeared irreconcilable, and the Court in Swain believed it had to
forfeit one or the other. Justice White explained:
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control.... It is often exercised upon the "sudden
impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive
upon the bare looks and gestures of another," upon a juror's "habits
and associations," or upon the feeling that "the bare questioning [of a
juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment." It is no
less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to
legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For
the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not
whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but
whether one from a different group is less likely to be.... Hence,
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the
conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a characterization
that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A
judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. As Justice Rehnquist concedes, prosecutors' peremptories are based on their "seat-of-the-pants instinct" as to how particular jurors will
vote. Yet, "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may well bejust another term for racial prejudice ....
It is worth remembering that "114 years after the close of the War
Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms of
discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our
society as a whole."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall,J., concurring) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
558-59 (1979)), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 627 (1986)(citation
omitted).
48

380 U.S. 202 (1965).

10
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veniremen are not always judged solely as individuals for the purposes
of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather, they are challenged in
light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include
their group affiliations, in the context of the case to be tried.
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the
laws. In the quest of an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and White,
Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without
cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to
the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each
and every challenge being open to examination, either at the time of
the challenge or at a hearing afterward. The prosecutor's judgment
underlying each challenge would be subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and 9sincerity. And a great many uses of the challenge would be
4
banned.
Thus, in Swain, the Court found it difficult to balance the use of
peremptory strikes with the equal protection principles enunciated

in Strauder, because, as Justice White explained, to limit or qualify
peremptory challenges is to destroy them. 50
Although Justice White's conclusion may be true, the question
then becomes, "Which right must give way-the right to exercise
peremptory challenges or the right to enjoy equal protection of the
law?" 5 1 As the dissenting Justices in Swain recognized, if it is
necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant
to have a jury chosen in conformity with the fourteenth amendment
and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a
choice of the former. Marbury v. Madison settled beyond a doubt that
when a constitutional5 2claim is opposed by a nonconstitutional one, the
former must prevail.

The majority in Swain, however, was reluctant to eliminate the
peremptory challenge because of its long history. Dating from Roman criminal trials, 5 3 the right survived virtually unquestioned until
Id. at 220-22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 221-22. " 'For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and
it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.'" Id. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
51 Of course, it is the prosecutor's right to peremptorily challenge veniremen that is
weighed against the defendant's right to equal protection. Generally, however, it is assumed that if the prosecutor forfeits his right to peremptorily challenge, so must the
defendant lose his corresponding right to exercise peremptories. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-108 (Marshall, J., concurring). This Article, however, does not
directly address this issue.
52 Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg, however, like
the Batson Court, did not think it necessary to make such an "absolute choice." Id.
53 W. Forsyth, HISTORY OF TRIAL BYJURY 175 (1852), quoted in Batson, 476 U.S. at 119
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49
50
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the twentieth century.5 4 Peremptory strikes were an integral part of
English common law, 5 5 even though they have rarely been used in
the last 100 years in Great Britain. 56 In the United States, Congress
established peremptory challenges in the 1790 Act 5 7 for all felonies
punishable by death. Because of the historical credentials of peremptory challenges and the widespread belief that the strikes are a
necessary aspect of trial by jury, their exercise is considered one of
the accused's most important rights. 58 The Supreme Court has held
that denial of a defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges
is per se reversible error without a showing of prejudice, 5 9 despite
60
the fact that the use of peremptories is not a constitutional right.
The Court, refusing in Swain to make an absolute choice between equal protection and peremptory challenges, attempted to
balance the two rights, placing only a slight restriction on the government's use of peremptories. 6 1 Ironically, the Swain ruling actually implies that the statutory right takes precedence over the
Swain, 380 U.S. at 216.
55 Coke on Littleton 156 (1791), cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 212; 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 349 (1899). The Court in Swain stated:
The system of struckjuries also has its roots in ancient common-law heritage. Since
striking a jury allowed both sides a greater number of challenges and an opportunity to become familiar with the entire venire list, it was deemed an effective means
of obtaining more impartial and better qualified jurors. Accordingly, it was used in
causes of "great nicety" or "where the sheriff [responsible for the jury list] was
suspected of partiality ..
" It was adopted as a fairer system to the defendant and
prosecution and a more efficacious, quicker way to obtain an impartial jury satisfactory to the parties.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting 3 Blackstone Commentaries *357).
56 Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 n.12.
57 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
58 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 ("The persistence of peremptories and their widespread
use demonstrate the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury" and "one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused.") (citations omitted).
59 Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)); Harrison v. United
States, 163 U.S. 140 (1895). Compare Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S.
348 (1894).
60 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
61 Id. at 223-24. The Court ruled:
54

In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a
pluralistic society in connection with the institution of the jury trial, we cannot hold
that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the
exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any given case
must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and
the prosecutor therefore subject to examination by allegations that in the case at
hand all Negroes were removed because they were Negroes. Any other result, we
think, would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system
as we know it.
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constitutional right. 6 2 Thus, in order to establish a successful equal
protection challenge to a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptories, Swain required proof of the continuous and wholesale
exclusion of blacks in case after case for reasons wholly unrelated to
the case being tried. 6 3 The defendants in Swain could not meet this
65
stringent test,64 nor could any defendant after Swain.
The Court in Swain also loosened the equal protection analysis
from its Strauder foundations. Rather than focusing on the defendant's interest in a jury of his peers, the Court purported to protect
only the interest of minority participation in the administration of
justice. 6 6 The ruling in Swain, therefore, provided no protection to
an individual defendant deprived of a jury of his peers through racially discriminatory strikes. In fact, the opinion sanctioned the use
of peremptory challenges on racial grounds in individual cases, precluding only the systematic exclusion of minorities in all cases. 67 As
one commentator has argued, "Swain itself is worse than useless in
protecting the black defendant from racial prejudice, for it affirmatively sanctions the very practice that threatens equal justice: the
68
elimination of black jurors in cases involving black defendants."
C.

BATSON V. KENTUCKY:

BALANCING EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Commentators soundly criticized Swain v. Alabama because of
62 Id. at 222.
63 Id. at 233-24. The Court stated:

[I]t is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular
jury on the assumption that the prosecution is acting on acceptable considerations
related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular
offense charged. But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever
the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may
be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes ... with the result that no Negroes
even serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance.... If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a
criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome.
Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from
juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of a particular case on trial and
that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negroes the same right and
opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white
population.
Id.
64 Id. The Court held that the record in Swain was clearly insufficient to demonstrate
how the state had violated the Swain rule. This ruling resulted despite the fact that,
although blacks had frequently been venireperson, it was undisputed that no black had
ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County. See id. at 234-35(Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
65 See Johnson, Black Innocence and the WhiteJury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611, 1658 (1985).
66 Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
67 Id. at 220. See supra note 63.
68 Johnson, supra note 65, at 1666.
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the crushing burden it imposed on defendants alleging racially discriminatory jury selection, 69 and its standard soon became outmoded. In 1965, when the Court decided Swain, an equal protection
claim of minority exclusion from venires required, consistent with
Swain, exclusion over an extended period of time. 70 Subsequent
opinions, though, ruled that a defendant may raise a prima facie
case of discrimination in venire selection based upon proof of underrepresentation on a single venire. 7 1 The Batson Court, recognizing this historical transition, rejected the Swain standard for proving
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by ruling that a defendant may base an equal protection violation on a prosecutor's
72
use of peremptories in a single case.
James Batson, a black man, was indicted for burglary and the
receipt of stolen goods. At trial, following voir dire by the court, the
prosecutor used his peremptories to strike all four black venirepersons. Batson's jury was all white. When defense counsel moved to
discharge the jury before it was sworn, alleging that the prosecutor's
removal of all the black venirepersons violated Batson's rights to a
cross-sectional jury and equal protection, the trial judge ruled that
the parties could use their peremptories to "strike anybody they
want to."' 73 The all-white jury convicted Batson on all counts. 74
Although Batson's lawyers originally argued the case to the
Supreme Court on fair cross-section grounds, the Court once again
69

See, e.g.,J. VAN

DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT

166-67 (1977); Imlay, Federaljury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247, 268-70 (1973); Johnson, Black Innocence and the
WhiteJury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Kuhn,Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1983); Note, Peremptory Challenge: Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. LJ. 157 (1957); Comment, Swain v. Alabama, A
ConstitutionalBlueprintfor the Perpetuationof the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966);.
70 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986).
71 Id. at 95.
72 The Court explained:
[S]ince the decision in Swain, this court has recognized that a defendant may make a
prima fade showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case. These decisions are in
accordance with the proposition, articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., that a "consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously
discriminatory governmental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions." For evidentiary requirements to dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one could object,
would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.
Id. at 95-96 (citations and footnote omitted)(emphasis in original)(quoting Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.14).
73 Id. at 83.
74 Id.
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS
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refused to extend that analysis to the jury itself.7 5 The obvious alternative was a revitalization of the equal protection analysis begun
in Strauder but later rendered impotent in Swain.76 Also reemerging
in Batson was the original goal of eliminating racially discriminatory
77
jury selection in order to create a jury of peers.
The Court reviewed the historical struggle to obtain representative juries, particularly Swain's attempt to accommodate both the
prosecutor's right to exercise peremptory challenges free ofjudicial
control and the constitutional prohibition against the racially motivated exclusion of persons from jury service. 7 8 The majority then
rejected the Swain standard of proof as inconsistent with its subsequent decisions upholding equal protection challenges to venire selection based on discrimination occurring in a single case. 7 9 In
sharp contrast to Swain, the new standard established in Batson allows a defendant to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection based solely on the prosecutor's peremptory
exclusion ofjurors in the defendant's trial.8 0
The Batson Court set down a seemingly simple three-part test.
First, the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group
and show that the prosecutor has peremptorily challenged members
of the defendant's race.8 1 Second, the defendant may rely on the
undisputed fact that peremptory challenges permit "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.- 8 2 Third, the defendant must show that the totality of relevant circumstances raises an
inference that the prosecutor used his peremptories to exclude prospective jurors because of their race. 83 The second element, clearly
present in all cases, is easily joined with the third Batson
requirement.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with a
neutral explanation for peremptorily challenging minority jurors.
Although this explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge
for cause, the prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case. A prosecutor's mere denial of discriminatory motive is not sufficient, nor is any explanation based upon an
75
76
77

78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 85-86 n.6.
Id. at 96-98.
Id.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93-96. Compare Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
476 U.S. at 96.
Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Id.
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assumption that blacks, as a group, are either unqualified to serve as
jurors or biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is
black.8 4 After the prosecutor has explained his peremptory strikes,
the trial judge must weigh this explanation against the evidence of
discrimination to determine if the defense has proven purposeful
discrimination.8 5
The Court in Batson, as it had done previously in Swain, refused
to sacrifice the historic role of the peremptory challenge. Unlike
the holding in Swain, however, the Batson ruling promoted the constitutional interest in eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection to a position equivalent to the right to exercise peremptory
strikes. This attempt to accommodate two fundamentally conflicting interests necessarily reached a "middle-ground" which was easily subject to criticism from both sides. The two schools of criticism
are apparent in the separate opinions of Justice Marshall and Chief
Justice Burger. Both strongly criticized the majority opinion-Marshall because it did not go far enough in its efforts to eliminate
racially discriminatory jury selection practices, and Burger because
it went too far, undercutting the historic role of peremptory
86
challenges.
Justice Marshall, preferring to strike the balance completely in
favor of equal protection rights, argued for the total elimination of
peremptory challenges as the only means to assure a color-blind
jury selection process. 8 7 He pointed to the experiences of Massachusetts and California, both of which, in response to the ineffectiveness of Swain, established proof requirements similar to those in
Batson. Cases from those jurisdictions illustrate the limits of Batson,
Justice Marshall argued, because only a flagrant case of discrimination can establish a prima facie case supporting an equal protection
challenge.8 8 Marshall concluded that requiring a prima facie case
84 Id. at 97-98. The Court explained: "The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that this State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions,
which arise solely from the jurors' race." Id.
85 Id. at 98. The relevant standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
86 See generally id. at 102-108 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 112-134 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting). See also id. at 134-139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass.
189, 195, 415 N.E.2d 805, 809-10 (1981)(no prima facie case of discrimination found
even though defendant was black, prospective jurors included three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor excluded one for cause and struck the remainder peremptorily, thereby producing all white jury); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 53637, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 987-98, (1982)(no prima facie case found where prosecutor peremptorily struck the only two blacks on the jury panel)).
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actually sanctions tokenism and insulates racial discrimination, provided only that prosecutors hold that discrimination to an "accepta89
ble" level.
Even when a defendant successfully raises an inference of purposeful discrimination, Justice Marshall doubted the ability of a trial
judge to assess a prosecutor's motives in striking a particular juror,
regardless of whether those motivations were conscious or unconscious. Justice Marshall wrote,
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a
juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second guess those reasons.
How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as the defendant,
or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivity necessary to realistically look at
the issues and decide the facts in this case?" If such generalized explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify
his strike on nonracial grounds, then, the protection erected by the
court today may be illusory. 90
Justice Marshall's criticism regarding the ease with which a prosecutor may rebut a prima facie case and the difficulty of assessing the
possibility of hidden racial motivations must be judged in the light
of post-Batson jurisprudence. If his concerns are substantiated, then
Batson, like Swain, is wholly inadequate to remedy racially discriminatory jury selection.
While Justice Marshall regarded a prosecutorial explanation as
trivial, Chief Justice Burger believed that requiring any explanation
would destroy the peremptory challenge. Burger characterized the
peremptory strike as "one of the most important of the rights in our
justice system,"9 1 and, as Justice White explained in the Swain majority opinion, an explained peremptory challenge is by definition
no longer peremptory.9 2 Chief Justice Burger's complaint was,
however, more complex than a definitional contradiction. He recognized the inherent conflict between the peremptory challenge and
the Strauder goal of ajury of peers protected by the equal protection
clause.
ChiefJustice Burger shed additional light on this conflict. Traditionally, the equal protection clause requires that governmental
89

Batson, 476

U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).

90 Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 672

P.2d 854 (1983)).
91 Id. at 121 (Burger, Cj., dissenting)(citations omitted).
92 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222 ("The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory,
each and every challenge being open to examination, either at the time of the challenge
or at a hearing afterward.").
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discrimination have, at a minimum, a rational basis or "minimum
rationality." On the other hand, lawyers often exercise peremptory
challenges with no rational basis. Instead, such challenges are the
product of hunches and "seat-of-the-pants instincts." 9 3 Indeed, that
is the very essence of a peremptory challenge. Therefore, Burger
concluded that an equal protection analysis was simply inconsistent
94
with and inapplicable to the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Moreover, the Chief Justice criticized the Batson majority opinion for infusing racial concerns into voir dire by requiring the prosecutor and the defense attorney to build a record containing the
racial composition of the jury, the race of the jurors challenged, and,
in some cases, the testimony of individual jurors as to their ethnic
background.9 5 As a result, Batson created an entirely different procedure for striking blacks as opposed to striking whites, which will
make even the jurors aware of the infusion of racial considerations
into voir dire. ChiefJustice Burger drew an analogy to the situation
prohibited in Avery v. Georgia,96 namely, the use of racially coded
tickets for venire selection. In Avery, Justice Frankfurter observed
that the dangers of a racially influenced system exist whenever the
mechanism for jury selection has a component part, such as the procedures outlined by the Batson majority, that differentiates between
97
white and black.
Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Burger agreed that there is
little compromise between equal protection and peremptory challenges and that the Batson middle-ground does little to serve either
interest. Their criticisms are, however, primarily speculative in nature, particularly since the Supreme Court delegated to trial courts
such wide discretion in the application of its newly promulgated
93 Justice Rehnquist used this term in his dissenting opinion. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94 ChiefJustice Burger stated:

Our system permits two types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges. Challenges for cause obviously have to be explained; by definition, peremptory challenges do not. "It is called a peremptory challenge, because the prisoner may challenge peremptorily, on his own dislike, without showing of any cause."
Analytically, there is no middle ground: a challenge either has to be explained or it
does not. It is readily apparent then, that to permit inquiry into the basis of a peremptory challenge would force "the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into the
challenge for cause."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original)(quoting H. Joy, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF JURORS 1 (1844); United States v.
Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
95 Id. at 129-30 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
96 345 U.S. 559 (1953), cited in Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
97 Avery, 345 U.S. at 564, quoted in Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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standards. Except for a few exceedingly simple illustrations,98 the
Court provided little guidance as to how to apply its standards, expressing great confidence in trial judges' experience in supervising
voir dire. Therefore, only through an examination and critique of
the post-Batson case law can one determine whether, and to what
extent, the Justices critical of the Batson holding were correct.
In light of the magnitude of the task facing the Court, it would
not be surprising if all the criticisms are valid. Any decision which
attempts to accommodate the irreconcilable must either sacrifice
one of two competing interests, or partially abrogate both in an attempt to arrive at a point of equilibrium. Inevitably, the absolute
proponents of either interest will criticize the balance struck. So,
perhaps the ultimate question is not which critics are correct, but
instead whether Batson is a worthy attempt at balancing equal protection concerns with peremptory jury selection interests, and, if so,
how courts may best apply the Batson standards to maximize both
rights.
With this goal in mind, as well as the century-old principles of
Strauder and the social commentary of Tocqueville, this Article undertakes an analysis and critique of the adolescent growth of the
Batson standards, demonstrates the practical failure of the Batson balance, and suggests a means of bolstering its protections.
II.
A.

THE BATSON JURISPRUDENCE

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

1.

The Requirement of a Timely Objection

The Supreme Court envisioned that a defendant should make a
Batson motion promptly, at a time when the trial court can easily
cure any racial discrimination apparent in the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory strikes. 99 Although the Supreme Court primarily
delegated to trial judges the task of formulating specific procedures
to implement its decision,10 0 the Court directed those judges to consider only "timely" objections to the exercise of peremptory challenges. 0 1 Implicit in the Court's opinion is that a "timely"
objection consists of a Batson challenge raised before the dismissal of
98 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 (providing examples of evidence relevant to the establishment of a prima facie case and examples of clearly insufficient prosecutorial
explanations).
99 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24.
100 Id. at 96-98, 99-100 n.24.
101 Id. at 96-99.
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10 2
the venire.
Both federal and state courts have consistently held that the
failure to make a timely objection effectively waives any arguments
based on improprieties in jury selection which the defendant might
urge pursuant to Batson.10 3 Although some state courts require only
that the defendant raise his Batson objection prior to the swearing in
of the jury, 10 4 the better rule requires objection prior to both the
10 5
swearing in of the jury and the dismissal of the venire.

102 Id. at.99-100 n.24. In its discussion of remedies for a successful Batson challenge,
the Court suggested the following two "appropriate" alternatives: discharging the venire and selecting a new jury from a newly impaneled venire; or reinstating the improperly challenged jurors on the venire. Obviously, each of these remedies presupposes
that the objection and the consequent determination of the Batson issue occur prior to
the dismissal of the venire.
103 United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 7576 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowden v.
Kemp, 793 F.2d 273, 275 (11th Cir. 1986); Brown v. State, No. 1, Div. 215, slip op. (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987)(LEXIS, States library); Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 736-37 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1987); State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986); Swain v.
State, 504 So. 2d 347, 349 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
The only possible exception is for failure to object timely in trials occurring prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Batson. The only federal court expressly speaking on
this issue merely assumed without deciding that the defendant's pre-Batson failure to
object did not foreclose application of Batson. U.S. v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070
(5th Cir. 1987). Any such assumption, however, is clearly inconsistent with an earlier
Fifth Circuit case in which the court specifically refused to inquire into the defendant's
Batson arguments on appeal because of his failure to interpose a timely objection at trial,
even though the trial obviously occurred prior to the Batson decision. United States v.
Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Erwin is consistent with other circuits' application of the timely objection rule in appeals of pre-Batson
trials. See, e.g., Virgin Island v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3rd Cir. 1986); Bowden v.
Kemp, 793 F.2d 273, 275 (11th Cir. 1986). In fact, the court in Bowden specifically addressed this issue, stating that other similarly situated defendants, including Batson himself, had no problem raising the objection in spite of the obvious restraints then placed
on defendants by the Supreme Court's 1965 ruling in Swain v. Alabama. Id. at 275.
Moreover, any possible exception to the timely objection rule for pre-Batson trials obviously rests on considerations of notice wholly inapplicable to an issue commanding such
widespread attention of defense lawyers. The racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges has been hotly debated since Swain. Certain states have interpreted their
constitutions so as to effectively avoid the effects of Swain. See cases cited in Batson, 476
U.S. at 82 n.1. Furthermore, as early as 1983, members of the Supreme Court openly
questioned the continuing vitality of Swain. Certainly, considerations of notice do not
require slackening the timely objection rule, even for trials occurring before the decision
in Batson.
104 See, e.g., State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). In Peck, the
court based its decision on a pure "waiver" rationale, ruling that after the jury is impaneled and sworn, the parties have acquiesced in its makeup and will not be permitted to
complain. Id. Perhaps this rule is in reality no different from that which the federal
courts apply, see infra note 105, but merely recognizes that judges generally dismiss
venires only at or after the time the jury is accepted by the parties and sworn.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987); Virgin Is-
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In United States v. Erwin,10 6 the defendant objected before the
jury was impaneled and sworn but a full week after the dismissal of
the venire.10 7 Recognizing that the timing of the motion to strike
the panel rendered any remedy extremely inconvenient, the Fifth
Circuit found the motion untimely, especially in view of defendant's
failure to offer any justification for the tardiness.10 8 Focusing on the
most convenient time to remedy discrimination in the exercise of
peremptories is consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of
timeliness in Batson.' 09 Indeed, the most convincing rationale for
adopting the Erwin view of timeliness is the promotion of the remedies envisioned in Batson, thereby avoiding not only the needless reversal of convictions, but unnecessary pre-trial delay as well. 1 10
Moreover, assuming the defendant establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the timely objection rule allows the prosecutor to
explain his use of peremptories at a time when his reasons are still
fresh in his mind."'
Just as a Batson motion can be untimely late, it can also be premature-before there is evidence sufficient for the trial judge to
rule. 1 2 The evidence most relevant to discrimination is the manner
in which the prosecutor questioned jurors and exercised peremptory strikes. 133 Therefore, the best time for the trial judge to properly address the issue of racial discrimination is at the close of voir
dire, after the lawyers have exercised all their strikes, but prior to
lands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3rd Cir. 1986)(requiring defendant to interpose a
Batson objection during or at the close of voir dire); United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d
656, 667 (5th Cir. 1986); Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987);
Brown v. State, No. 1, Div. 215, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)(LEXIS, States library).
106 793 F.2d at 667.
107 Id.
108 In light of the nature of the Batson objection, it is difficult to conceive of any valid
reason for waiting until after the judge dismisses the venire until interposing an objection. All the facts relevant to the establishment of a prima facie case should be apparent
to the defendant at the close of voir dire.
109 See supra notes -101-102 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit explained in
Erwin that a successful objection would have necessitated summoning a new venire in
order to select a new jury and would have greatly delayed the trial. Erwin, 793 F.2d at
667.
110 See United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987). After the trial
judge dismisses the venire, it is impossible to reseat those members of the jury whom
the prosecutor excluded because of their race. The court would have to summon a new
venire and begin jury selection anew.
111 Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1011; Forte, 806 F.2d at 76. The court in Forte also noted that
requiring an explanation while the prosecutor's recollections are fresh will facilitate
meaningful appellate review. Id. at 76 & n. 1.
112 For example, in Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), the
defense attorney made a motion before voir dire asking the trial judge to foreclose the
prosecutor from striking any blacks. Such a motion is certainly premature.
113 See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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dismissal of the venire.11

2.

The Elements of a Prima Facie Case

According to Batson, two steps are required in order for a defendant to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.
First, a defendant must show that he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group, members of which the prosecutor has removed
from the venire by the exercise of peremptory challenges. Second, a
defendant must raise an inference of intentional discrimination
based on the aforementioned removal, the fact that peremptory
challenges permit discrimination by those who are of such a mind,
15
and any other relevant circumstances occurring during voir dire.'
a.

Cognizable Racial Group

The Supreme Court limited its decision in Batson to peremptories exercised against venirepersons belonging to the same racial
group as the defendant.' 6 The courts have faithfully applied this
limitation, refusing to find a prima facie case if the defendant be17
longs to a different race than the jurors peremptorily stricken.'
114 Thus, defense counsel should refrain from making a Batson motion-and the judge
should refrain from addressing it-each time the prosecutor chooses to strike a potential
juror who shares the defendant's race. Not only is such a strike probably insufficient in
and of itself to constitute a prima fade case, but in light of the factors which the judge
must consider in determining the existence of a prima facie case, the most logical and
judicially economical time to address the motion is after the parties have initially setded
on a jury. At this time, and not until this time, the trial judge will have before him the
necessary information on which to base the prima facie determination.
115 476 U.S. at 96. The Court in Batson actually purports to set down a three-part test
for establishing a prima facie case. According to the Court, the second element is that
the "defendant is entitled to rely on the fact.., that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' " Id. (citing Avery, 345 U.S. at 562). It is clear, however, that the second factor is
really a non-factor; it exists in every case in which the government has exercised peremptories. At most, it is a fact relevant to whether the defendant has raised an inference
of intentional discrimination. Thus, Batson is essentially a dual inquiry.
116 476 U.S. at 96-97. In fact, Batson was originally argued to the Court on sixth
amendment fair cross-section grounds which, if successful, would have allowed any defendant to challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptories on the grounds of racial discrimination. The Court's selection of equal protection grounds as the basis for its
holding probably reflects a conscious desire to limit the defendants who may use this
new jury selection "sword." Moreover, deciding the case on fair cross-section grounds
not only would increase the number of defendants who could challenge the prosecutor's
use of peremptories but also would open the door to defendants contesting peremptory
strikes directed against any group, racial or otherwise, which is a distinctive group in the
community for fair cross-section purposes.
117 United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); Wingo v. Blackburn,
783 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1986)(refusing, prior to Batson, to extend an equal protection challenge to a defendant not belonging to the same race as the jurors peremptorily
stricken). But see Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Conn.
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The question of what is a "cognizable racial group" for Batson
purposes has not arisen frequently, probably because most of the
cases involve black defendants, as in Batson itself, or Hispanic defendants, a racial group to whom the courts have extended the Batson principles without discussion." 8 At least two federal circuit
courts, however, faced with difficult questions concerning defendant's membership in a "cognizable racial group," have formulated
tests to resolve the problem. 119
In United States v. Dennis,120 the defendants argued that they
could base a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on the
government's peremptory exclusion of all black males from the
jury. 12 1 Thejury ultimately included two black females, and the trial
court apparently relied upon this factor in refusing to inquire into
the prosecutor's reasons for striking three black males. 12 2 The Eleventh Circuit held that black males, as opposed to blacks generally,
do not constitute a "cognizable racial group."' 123 The Dennis court
used the same test applied in Casteneda v. Partida,12 4 which the
Supreme Court cited in Batson as authority for the "cognizable racial
group" requirement.' 2 5 According to Casteneda, a "cognizable racial
group" is essentially a recognizable, distinct class which has been
1986) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when the government, defending a civil rights suit, discriminatorily struck blacks from the jury, even though the plaintiff was white). In Clark, the Court based its decision on its inherent supervisory power
to protect the rights of the excluded jurors, whose rights, along with those of the defendant, the Court in Batson expressly purported to vindicate. 476 U.S. at 87-88. The
Clark decision, of course, also expands Batson by giving the "Batson-sword" to a plaintiff
in a civil rights action against a state.
118 See Esquivel v. McCotter, 791 F.2d 350, 351 (5th Cir. 1986)(accepting without inquiry that Hispanics are a cognizable racial group, but rejecting defendants prima facie
claim as without support in the record of voir dire); Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d
1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1986)("[I]t is undisputed that appellant is a member of a cognizable
racial group."). The most common problem facing Mexican-American defendants in
establishing a prima facie case is the creation of a record which indicates that the Spanish-surnamed jurors excluded were, in fact, Mexican-Americans. See id. at 1134-35.
It also appears that American Indians are a "cognitive racial group." United States
v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987).
119 United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Dennis, 804
F.2d 1208, 1210 (11 th Cir. 1986)(per curiam).
120 804 F.2d 1208 (11 th Cir. 1986)(per curiam).
121 Id. at 1210.
122 The Eleventh Circuit certainly regarded the presence of the two black women on
the jury as an important factor in holding that the defendants failed to establish a prima
facie case. Id. at 1210-11.

123 Id. at 1210.

124 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
125 476 U.S. at 96 (noting Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 494).
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victimized by past discrimination. 126 Although blacks as a group
qualify under the Casteneda definition, the defendant in Dennis failed
to show that black males constitute a recognizable, distinct class
which has been discriminated against not simply as blacks, but as
12 7
black males.
The First Circuit, in United States v. Sgro, 128 articulated a different definition to assess whether Italian-Americans constitute a "cognizable racial group."' 129 Borrowing heavily from fair cross-section
cases-a questionable tactic in light of Batson's equal protection
foundations-the court in Sgro strictly defined "cognizable racial
group":
(1) [T]he group must be definable and limited by some clearly identifiable factor, (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences
must run through the group, and (3) there must exist a community of
interests among the members, such that the group's interests cannot
be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. 130
While the court in Sgro did not deny cognizable group status to
Italian-Americans, it held that the defendant failed to supply evidence, other than conclusory allegations, that Italian-Americans are
indeed a cognizable racial group.' 3 ' If nothing else, the opinion in
Sgro indicates that defendants belonging to racial groups other than
black or Hispanic may be required to make a prima facie showing of
group cognizability as part of establishing the broader prima facie
3 2
case of intentional discrimination.1
The Eleventh Circuit test applied in Dennis is perhaps more defensible than the First Circuit's test in Sgro because the former
originated in Casteneda, a Supreme Court opinion applying an equal
protection analysis to a closely related issue-racial discrimination
126 Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 494. See also Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1210; Clark v. City of
Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Conn. 1986).
127 Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1210.
128 816 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir. 1987).
129 Id. at 33.
130 Id. The Supreme Court used this test in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979), to determine a "distinct group" for fair cross-section purposes. The Duren test
logically includes more "groups" within its definition than the Casteneda characterization
of "cognitive racial group." This is because the Court in Duren was attempting to prevent exclusion from jury selection of any group which might bring a unique perspective
to the jury, thereby making the jury representative of the community. See Duren, 439
U.S. at 370. On the other hand, the purpose of the Casteneda standard is essentially to
define those groups which, because of past discrimination, the law regards as a "suspect
class" for purposes of equal protection analysis.
131 Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33.
132 See id.
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in selecting venires.' 3 3 Neither test, however, correctly accords the
Batson decision its proper scope. Consider the interesting racial
turnabout occurring in Virgin Islands v. Forte.13 4 In a predominately
black, Virgin Island community, a white defendant accused of raping a black female college student stood trial before a jury composed entirely of blacks. 135 The government exercised four of its six
peremptory strikes to remove all whites from thejury.I3 6 The Third
Circuit did not decide whether whites ever constitute a "cognizable
racial group" under Batson, basing its decision instead on the defendant's untimely objection to the prosecutor's use of peremptories.137 Clearly, though, it would violate the spirit of Batson to deny
the white defendant in Forte the opportunity, if timely asserted, to
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and require
the prosecutor to come forward with a racially-neutral explanation. 138 Although the racial roles were reversed, the defendant in
Forte found himself in exactly the same situation as the defendant in
Batson; both were utterly without ajury of peers because of the prosecutor's use of peremptories. If the prosecutor in Forte struck the
white jurors solely on the basis of race, such discrimination is precisely the harm Batson sought to prevent. 13 9 Whites, therefore, must
constitute a "cognizable racial group" at least in certain cases.
A more interesting question, and a correspondingly more difficult one, is whether whites are a "cognizable racial group" even
outside the unique trial setting in Forte. Again, the rationale underlying the Batson decision suggests that no juror, regardless of race,
should be removed simply because he happens to share the same
race as the defendant. 140 Exclusion of a potential juror simply because he is white is no less racial discrimination than exclusion of a
133 See Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 494. On the other hand, the First Circuit's test, enunciated in Sgro, has a fair cross-section foundation. See supra note 130.
134 806 F.2d 73 (3rd Cir. 1986).
135 Id. at 74-75.
136 Id. at 75.
137 Id. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the timely
objection rule and how it applies to a Batson motion.
138 This assertion raises the question of whether it is logical-or proper-that the
parameters of the phrase "cognitive racial group" should depend upon the particular
facts of a case, such as the location of the trial, the minority status of a certain group in
that location, and the respective races of both defendant and victim. Or, on the other
hand, is a "cognitive racial group" a "cognitive racial group" for all seasons? See infra
notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
139 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-88 (explaining that its holding was designed to promote
ajury of peers, minority participation on criminal juries, and the appearance of fairness).
140 See id. The Court in Batson emphasized not only discrimination against the defendant, but the juror as well, stating: "Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends
on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
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juror simply because he is black. Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Batson never suggested that its holding is limited to cases tried in
locales where blacks or Hispanics constitute a minority of the
population.141
In light of the above conclusions, the definitions of "cognizable
racial group" expressed in Dennis and Sgro are underinclusive. The
Dennis-Casteneda definition, which essentially describes a "suspect
class"-a group which has suffered at the hands of pervasive past
racial discrimination-is underinclusive because it does not encompass whites 142 and omits many other ethnic groups. 143 Under the
definition used by the First Circuit in Sgro, a "cognizable racial
group" must share a common thread of attitudes, ideas, or experiences, 14 4 which hardly describes the melting pot of Caucasians in
this country.
Instead of borrowing bright line tests originating from concerns different than those evoked in Batson, courts should strive to
tailor the definition to the express purpose of Batson. If the
Supreme Court intended to prevent the racially motivated exercise
of peremptory strikes, a prosecutor violates the spirit of Batson
whenever he strikes a juror simply because that juror shares the
same racial or ethnic group as the defendant, no matter what color,
race, or ethnicity is involved. It makes little sense to limit the Batson
remedy only to those groups that qualify as a "cognizable racial
group" under tests which are clearly underinclusive in light of the
spirit and letter of Batson. Courts should construe "cognizable racial
group" broadly to include any racial or ethnic group in which membership is readily apparent to prosecutors because of physical ap145
pearance, surname, or other factors.
presented at trial. A person's race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." id.
(citations omitted).
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the harm from discriminatory jury selection
touches the entire community by undermining public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system. Id. at 1718.
It is difficult to see any distinction in terms of degrees of harm to defendant, jurors,
or the community if the racial roles are reversed, as in Forte, or if the group discriminated against happens to hold a majority position in the community.
141 See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
142 See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Conn. 1986)(specifically
stating that a white person is not a member of any cognizable group victimized by
discrimination).
143 Recall the reluctance of the First Circuit in Sgro to assume that Italian-Americans
are a cognitive racial group in the absence of evidence offered by the defendant tending
to show such group status. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
144 Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33.
145 This broad test reflects the concern articulated in Batson that the jury selection
process permits "'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" 476 U.S.
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Certainly, some groups are more likely to suffer the harms Batson attempts to remedy, and this broad definition is not meant to
obscure the fact that it was the wholesale exclusion of blacks from
certain juries that prompted the Court's decision. 14 6 The broad definition of "cognizable racial group" merely recognizes that the nature of peremptory challenges permits those to discriminate who are
of a mind to and makes any racial or ethnic group a potential target
for discrimination in jury selection. Certainly, the white defendant
in Forte was a possible target, even though whites generally do not
suffer this type of discrimination, particularly in a venue where they
constitute the majority. The identity of the relevant racial group or
its lack of minority status in a particular area should never preclude
a Batson challenge if the evidence otherwise raises an inference of
intentional racial discrimination. Rather, the particular racial group
involved, its minority status, and the general attitude of the community toward this group are factors for a court to consider in deciding
whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of intentional
47
discrimination. 1
Whether racially discriminatory jury selection threatens a member of a particular racial group and requires the implementation of
the Batson remedy necessarily depends on the facts of each case. Ordinarily, a white defendant's allegations of racial discrimination
need to be accompanied by more exacting evidentiary proof than
similar allegations by a black defendant in order to raise the relevant
inference. On the other hand, the white defendant in Forte should
not have to make as strong a showing as whites generally. 48 This
approach is nothing more than recognition of the fact that some
49
groups generally suffer more from discrimination than others,
but in a given set of circumstances, such as existed in Forte, the danger of discrimination against whites may be as great as the potential
for discrimination in Batson. In such a case, Batson should clearly
apply.
at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). Obviously, this concern
exists for any racial or ethnic group whose identity can be discerned by prosecutors
either by means of physical appearance, such as blacks, whites, and Hispanics, or surname, such as Italian-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Polish-Americans, and IrishAmericans.
146 This is evident from the Supreme Court's historical discussion of racial discrimination injury selection. In this country, blacks have suffered the brunt of racial discrimination. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
147 These factors fit nicely into the totality of circumstances test suggested by the
Court in Batson. 476 U.S. at 96-98..
148 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Forte case.
149 Equal protection law reflects this observation in its designation of certain groups
as "suspect classes."
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In sum, rather than excluding certain groups from the penumbra of Batson protection simply because the group is not typically the
target of discrimination nor a minority in the particular locale, trial
judges should treat the identity of the racial group and its local status only as evidence of whether the defendant has raised an inference of purposeful discrimination. The experience of trial judges in
supervising voir dire will allow them to engage in this more exacting
and more accurate analysis.' 50
b.

Raising the Inference-A Numbers Game?

The Supreme Court in Batson did little to clarify the type of evidence which supports an inference of intentional discrimination,
preferring to leave that task to trial judges.' 51 While stating that
trial courts should consider the totality of the relevant circumstances, the Court provided only two vague examples: a "pattern"
of strikes against jurors of defendant's racial group, and the prosecutor's conduct during voir dire. 152 The Supreme Court did not expound further on what constitutes a "pattern," and this vague
language has led many lower courts to employ a variety of numbers
games. 153 These games essentially focus on one or more of the following inquiries: 1) How many members of the defendant's race
remain on the jury after the government has exercised all of its peremptories?; 15 4 2) How many members of the defendant's race did
the prosecutor remove by virtue of her exercise of peremptory
strikes?; 15 5 and 3) Was the prosecutor's overall use of peremptories
against members of the relevant racial group substantially proporSee Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22.
"We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be
able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors." Id. at 97.
152 Id. The Court specifically emphasized that these examples were only "illustrative." Therefore, it is clear that the Supreme Court meant to avoid setting down any
bright line rule, preferring to trust the trial court's assessment of all the relevant circumstances. In other words, the presence or absence of any one factor should not be determinative. Whether the defendant has raised an inference of intentional discrimination
necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
153 See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 n.7 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314
(10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Fleming
v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478, 1483-84 (11 th Cir. 1986)(rejecting the use of one "game of
numbers" but implictly accepting another).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 1987); Chalan,
812 F.2d at 1314; United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1986)(per
curiam).
155 See, e.g., Vaccaro, 816 F.2d at 457; Ratcliff, 806 F.2d at 1256.
150
151
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tionate to the population of that group on the venire? 156 Although
these numbers games are factors relevant to the occurrence of discrimination, problems arise when courts attempt to fashion one of
these factors into an absolute rule. To analyze these problems, it is
necessary to take a closer look at each "game."
i.

The First Game: "Solitaire"

This game focuses on whether any members of the defendant's
racial group pass the tests of voir dire and sit on the jury. The
prosecutorial object of the game is to remove all the blacks except
one or two as a showing of good faith. Some courts, eager to play
games to avoid inquiry into the prosecutor's underlying motivations, have ruled that leaving a token black on the jury precludes any
inference of intentional discrimination, particularly if the prosecutor
had peremptory strikes remaining. 15 7 Accordingly, in United States v.
Montgomery, the Eighth Circuit stated: "The fact that the government accepted ajury which included two blacks, when it could have
used its remaining peremptory challenges to strike these potential
jurors, shows that the government did not attempt to exclude all
blacks, or as many blacks as it could, from the jury."'' 5 8 Based on
this fact alone, the court in Montgomery ruled that the defendant
raised no inference of purposeful discrimination. 59
The Eighth Circuit's analysis suffers from a major flaw. Simply
156 See, e.g., Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1011 n.7; Fleming, 794 F.2d at 1484.
157 Montgomery, 819 F.2d at 851; Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1211; State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d
553, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The language in Peck and Montgomery comes very
close to establishing an absolute rule that if any member of the defendant's racial group
remains on the jury, the court will not inquire into the prosecutor's use of peremptories.
A charitable reading of Dennis permits a conclusion that the court regarded token representation as only one factor for the trial judge to consider, although the language cer-

tainly indicates that the court deemed it a very significant factor. In any event, later
Eleventh Circuit opinions most likely have undercut the impact of Dennis. See infra notes
160-65 and accompanying text.
158 819 F.2d at 851.
159 Id. Because the Eleventh Circuit was reviewing a district court finding that the
defendant had raised no inference of discrimination, the deferential standard of review
could have influenced the decision in Montgomery. The court, however, failed to expressly defer to the trial court, and a plain reading of the opinion indicates that the
Eleventh Circuit essentially based its ruling on the fact that the government allowed
blacks to sit on the jury which determined the defendant's guilt.
The language used by the court in State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Grim.
App. 1986), is even more indicative of an absolute rule:
[T]he prosecuting attorney did not use his peremptory challenges to remove all
members of defendant's race from the jury. A black woman was left on the panel
and [the] prosecution had one challenge left. Thus, in addition to not making a
timely motion, the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of a racially discriminatory purpose.
Id.
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by accepting one juror of the defendant's race, a prosecutor insulates all his peremptory strikes from a Batson inquiry. In this way,
the game of "solitaire" permits all but the most blatant racial discrimination and encourages tokenism.
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected this analysis in Fleming
v. Kemp,' 60 ruling that Batson may not be rendered inapplicable by a
"prosecutorial game of numbers." 161
Later, in United States v.
16
2
David, the court refined its decision in Fleming, ruling that striking
even one black juror for a racial reason violates the equal protection
clause, no matter how many blacks remain on the jury. 163 According to the court, the Batson command is to eliminate, not merely
minimize, racial discrimination in jury selection. 164 The Eleventh
Circuit's conclusions in Fleming and David are sound, unless one
reads Batson as protecting a defendant only from the total exclusion
of his peers from jury participation. Nothing in Batson, however, indicates that its principles should be so narrowly confined. Quite the
contrary, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Batson that a single
discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of
16 5
such discrimination in making similar decisions.
ii.

The Second Game: "Going, Going, Gone"

This game, closely related to "Solitaire," focuses on the
number of the defendant's racial group remaining on the jury after
794 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1483.
803 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1571. See also Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 65 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (construing Batson as indicating that "regardless of the number of minority race
veniremen that actually serve, the prosecutor may not use peremptory strikes to eliminate any potential juror solely on the basis of that person's race") (emphasis in original).
164 David, 803 F.2d at 1571. The Eleventh Circuit explained:
Batson rejects the view in Swain that the Equal Protection Clause only requires that
black citizens not be deprived ofjury service by being systematically excluded from
petit juries; Batson rests on a rationale that blacks are entitled not to be struck for
racial reasons, and black defendants are entitled to be tried in a system free of racially exclusionary practices. This represents more than a group entitlement not to
be entirely excluded from participation. Rather, under Batson, the striking of one
juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other
black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the striking of some black
jurors are shown.
Id.
165 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 n.14 (1977)). Of course, this language was used in Batson to reject the Swain
requirement that a prima facie case must include a showing of racial discrimination in
case after case. Henceforth, a defendant may establish racial discrimination solely on
the facts of his case. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. However, the spirit
of this language certainly supports the decisions in Fleming and David that a single racially motivated peremptory challenge violates the equal protection clause.
160
161
162
163

SERR AND MANEY

[Vol. 79

the government has exercised all of its peremptory strikes. The difference is that this game works to the defendant's advantage. The
courts playing the game have found an inference of discrimination
whenever a prosecutor strikes from the jury all members of the defendant's racial group. 166 In United States v. Chalan,167 for example,
the prosecutor peremptorily struck only one member of the American-Indian defendant's racial group.1 6 8 Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the removal of even one juror constitutes a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination if such removal effects a
1 69
complete exclusion from the jury of the pertinent racial group.
This "automatic" prima facie case is certainly a fiction. The absence of a racial group, without more, does not raise an inference of
intentional discrimination any more than the presence of one member of a group defeats the inference. In either case, the presence or
absence of the relevant racial group should be only one of the factors which the trial judge should consider.1 7 0 In spite of its fictional
status, the Chalan rule is commendable because it targets a situation
in which intentional discrimination, if it does exist, magnifies the
harms Batson seeks to avoid.1 7 1 According to Batson, racial discrimination in jury selection harms: the defendant, because of his inter166 United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987). See also State v.
Sandoval, 736 P.2d 501, 505 (N.M. 1987); Commonwealth v. McCormick, 359 Pa.
Super. 461, 469, 519 A.2d 442, 446 (1986).
167 812 F.2d 1302.
168 Id. at 1314. Although the government used peremptory challenges to remove two
American Indians, the trial judge indicated in the record that he would have removed
one of these jurors for cause because of language problems had either party so requested. Id. at 1312. Thus, the Tenth Circuit treated this case as if the government had
peremptorily removed only one American Indian. See also Sandoval, 736 P.2d at 505
(state peremptorily challenged only two Hispanics); McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. at 46869, 519 A.2d at 445-46 (three blacks peremptorily removed).
169 Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1314.
170 See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text for a discussion suggesting the
proper role of "numbers games." The conclusion of this author is that Batson does not
logically reduce to absolute tests. The nature of the inquiry is fact-based. It necessarily
varies from case to case. Thus, the absence of the defendant's racial group members
from the jury may raise an inference of intentional discrimination in some cases but not
in others. Whether the defendant has raised an inference is going to depend, in all
except the most extreme cases, on more factors than any workable "numbers game" can
assimilate.
171 This, however, was not the reason for the court's ruling in Chalan. Rather, the
Tenth Circuit believed that the risk of discrimination is itself so substantial in cases of
total exclusion that the court should inquire into the government's reasons in every such
case. 812 F.2d at 1314. Such reasoning belittles the confidence shown in trial judges by
the Supreme Court in Batson, for it essentially takes the prima facie issue away from trial
judges in any case where members of the pertinent group remain on the jury. This not
only underestimates the ability of trial judges to weigh the totality of circumstances, it
also completely ignores the role played by other factors.
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est in being tried by a jury of his peers; the struck jurors, whose race
is unrelated to their fitness for jury service; and the community, because discrimination injury selection undermines public confidence
in the overall fairness of the criminal justice system. 17 2 These harms
are most significant at the same time they are most apparent-when
discrimination injury selection results in ajury completely devoid of
members of the defendant's racial group. Thus, because the magnitude of the harm envisioned by Batson is greater, courts should be
cautious to ensure that no discrimination exists whenever the prosecution peremptorily strikes all prospective jurors of defendant's
race. 173 The Tenth Circuit's approach in Chalan is merely one way
174
to exercise that additional caution.
iii. The Third Game: "Strike Two, Get One Free"
This game is derived directly from the Supreme Court's language in Batson denoting a "pattern" of strikes as one example of
evidence "which might give rise to an inference of [intentional] discrimination."' 75 Although a "pattern" certainly connotes more
than one strike, the Supreme Court used this example only as an
illustration. Some courts, however, have construed it literally to
preclude any inference of purposeful discrimination when the pros76
ecutor peremptorily strikes only one member of defendant's race. 1
For example, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vaccaro ruled that
172
173

476 U.S. at 85-88.

This philosophy is similar to Learned Hand's formula in the landmark torts case,
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1948). Under the Carroll
formula (B<PL), persons should take extra precautions to avoid harm whenever the
burden of taking those additional precautions (B) is less than the probability of the harm
(P) multiplied by the magnitude of the harm (L, meaning "loss"). Id. at 173
Though perhaps unintentionally, the rule in Chalan reflects this formula. In Chalan,
L represents the magnitude of the harm caused by racial discrimination injury selection
which is greater when the relevant group is wholly excluded from jury participation. P
represents the probability that discrimination has occurred and is essentially a constant
in this situation absent other facts and circumstances, which Chalan shuns. B represents
the burden imposed on prosecutors by making them explain their peremptory challenges even though, technically, no prima facie case exists. The court in Chalan concluded that B<PL in this situation primarily because of the probability that discrimination
has occurred. See Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1314. Although the court's rationale is weak, see
supra note 171, its conclusion that B<PL is supportable because of the role of the factor
Chalan ignored-L, i.e., the magnitude of harm caused by discrimination when all members of defendant's race have been stricken from the jury.
174 Moreover, this additional caution will come at no great cost to prosecutors, whom
the court will simply require to provide a racially neutral reason for the strike, a task
which will be familiar to them in light of Batson.
175 476 U.S. at 97.
176 United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); Fields v. People, 732
P.2d 1145, 1158 n.20 (Colo. 1987).
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the striking of even two jurors does not constitute a "pattern."' 17 7
In a similar ruling, the Supreme Court of Colorado expressly stated
that "the forbidden use of [discriminatory] peremptory challenges
...presupposes that the prosecutor peremptorily struck more than
78
one member of a cognizable group."'
The problem with playing "One Free Strike," or "Two Free
Strikes" in the case of Vaccaro, is that it insulates and even encourages racial discrimination, so long as it is limited to one or two jurors. 179 This directly conflicts with the rationale underlying those

cases ruling that tokenism does not cure racial discrimination exhibited toward other potential black members of that jury. 8 0 For example, in United States v. David,'8 ' the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
striking even one black juror for a racial reason violates the equal
protection clause. The court emphasized that the Batson command
is to eliminate, not merely reduce, racial discrimination in jury
82
selection.1
The conflict apparent in the David and Vacarro decisions reflects
the tension between the equal protection clause and the historic role
of the peremptory challenge. Requiring the defendant to establish a
prima facie case before calling on the prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenges is the only aspect of Batson which preserves the
peremptory nature of the challenge. 18 3 Thus, even though striking
one juror for racial reasons is a violation of the letter-and the
177 816 F.2d at 457. Perhaps the opinion in Vaccaro can be interpreted to mean that
striking two jurors does not, without further proof by the defendant, raise an inference
of discrimination. If the only evidence presented by defendant in support of such an
inference is that the prosecutor employed a "pattern" of strikes against members of the
defendant's race, then a court is certainly justified in ruling that one or two is not a
"pattern" and that more evidence is necessary to raise the relevant inference.
The danger of the loose language in Vaccaro is that it could be read as insulating
some racial discrimination from inquiry. In other words, as long as the prosecutor does
not racially discriminate against more than two jurors, he will not have to explain his
strikes, and such discrimination will go undetected. Such an interpretation substantiates the fears expressed by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Batson. See supra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text.

178 Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1158 n.20 (Colo. 1987)(en banc). The language
in Fields does not permit the charitable explanation given Vaccaro, supra note 177.
179 This is the same problem discussed earlier in relation to the numbers game of
"solitaire." See supra notes -159-65 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
181 803 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1986).
182 Id. at 1571. Accord United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987);
Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478, 1473 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d
58, 65 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
183 In other words, but for the prima facie case requirement, prosecutors would have
to explain every peremptory strike of a black juror, thereby effectively eliminating peremptory challenges of jurors who share the same race as defendant.
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spirit-of Batson, the fact that the prosecutor has peremptorily
struck only one member of defendant's race should not, absent
other evidence raising an inference of discrimination, require the
prosecutor to come forward with the reasons behind the strike.
Otherwise, the Batson requirement of a prima facie case will become
meaningless.
The Fifth Circuit struck the appropriate balance in United States
v. Ratclif,184 holding that a prima facie case is not established
merely because the government challenges ajuror whose race is the
same as that of the defendant. 18 5 Instead, according to the court,
the defendant must raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the
prospective juror because of her race. 186 Implicit in the court's ruling is that the striking of one member of defendant's racial group
does not, without more, raise an inference of purposeful discrimination, and the prosecutor should not, therefore, have to explain that
strike.
The rationale of Ratclif logically extends to cases where the
prosecutor peremptorily strikes more than one member of the defendant's racial group. Three justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois suggested, in People v. Hooper,18 7 that there is no quantitative
formula with which to gauge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. Rather, the number of blacks removed, whether large or
small, is one factor for the trial court to consider in exercising the
wide discretion envisioned by Batson. 188 Certainly this factor is entitled to more weight the greater the number of blacks removed, but
as the concurring Justices in Hooper correctly recognized, playing an
absolute numbers game is neither necessary, in light of the trial
courts ability to assess other factors, nor wise.
806 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1256. The government excluded only one black, a female, with its
peremptories.
184
185

186 Id.
187 118 Ill. 2d 244, 247-49, 506 N.E.2d 1305, 1306-07 (1987) (Ryan, joined by Ward
and Moran, JJ., specially concurring). The majority opinion merely remanded a
number of cases without comment as to how the trial court should apply the Batson
standards.
188 Id. The specially concurring justices in Hooper stated that even the exclusion of a
significant number of blacks is insufficient in and of itself to reverse a trial court's determination that the defendant failed to raise an inference of intentional discrimination. Id.
at 1307. This does not mean that peremptorily challenging a large number of defendant's racial group will never be sufficient, standing alone, to raise the relevant inference.
Rather, the opinion reflects the great deference paid to the trial judge in assessing
whether the defendant established a prima facie case.
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The Fourth Game: "Probabilityand Statistics"

This game is played with ratios and percentages. The object is
to demonstrate a disproportionate use of the prosecutor's peremptories against the relevant racial group by comparing the percentage of the prosecutor's total strikes aimed at that group with the
percentage of that group on the venire. For example, in United States
v. Montgomery,' 89 although blacks constituted only fourteen percent
of the venire, the government used thirty-three percent of its peremptory strikes (two of six) to remove blacks.' 90 The Eighth Circuit, however, ruled that this statistical disparity did not, without
more, raise an inference of intentional discrimination.191 The court
expressly noted that Batson does not require prosecutors to adhere
to any specific mathematical formula when exercising their peremptory strikes. 19 2 The Eleventh Circuit revealed the proper role of this
type of statistical analysis in Fleming v. Kemp, where the prosecutor
used eight of his ten peremptory challenges (eighty percent) to
strike blacks; the percentage of blacks in the venire was approximately twenty percent (ten of fifty-five). 193 While specifically rejecting the use of numbers games as determinative, 19 4 the court
found that statistics of this type are, at a minimum, relevant factors
19 5
for the trial judge's consideration.
The Fifth Circuit found the lack of such a statistical disparity to
be a factor militating against an inference of discrimination in United
States v. Forbes, stating that the black/white ratio on the venire mirrored that of thejury.196 This statistic, though reflective of the same
189 819 F.2d 847
190 Id. at 850.

(8th Cir. 1987).

191 Id. at 851. The defendant requested the Eighth Circuit to remand his case so that

the trial court could determine whether this proportional disparity established a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination. Defendant's initial trial occurred prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson, but the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Batson applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal. Griffith v. Kentucky, 107
S. Ct. 708 (1987). By rejecting the defendant's request for a remand, the Eighth Circuit
necessarily determined, as a matter of law, that the statisical evidence in Montgomery was
insufficient in and of itself to raise the relevant inference.
192 819 F.2d at 851.
193 794 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986).
194 Id. at 1483.
195 Id. at 1484. Accord Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1011 n.7. In Fleming, the defendant requested a stay of execution until the Supreme Court decided the retroactivity of Batson.
In granting the stay, the Eleventh Circuit did not need to rule on the issue of whether
the defendant's statistical information established a prima facie case. At the very least,
however, the court's opinion indicates that such a statistical showing is relevant to the
prima facie case.
196 816 F.2d at 1011 n.7. According to the court, the comparison of the black/white
ratio of the venire to that of the jury is relevant to both the raising and rebutting of the
Batson prima facie case.
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concern as the statistical information in Montgomery, is perhaps less
accurate because it does not account for challenges for cause. In
other words, there are reasons other than a discriminatory use of
peremptories why the black/white ratio on a jury may not mirror
that of the venire. 19 7 On the other hand, the statistic used in Fleming
focuses solely on the use of peremptory strikes and is, therefore,
more relevant to the question of whether the prosecutor has intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. In all cases, however, the
trial judge should use ratios and percentages only as factors bearing
on the prima facie determination, and never as a litmus test.
v.

The Proper Role of Numbers Games

The Batson balance is too delicate, and the factors relevant to
the prima facie inference too numerous, to be responsive to any litmus test. As the preceding discussion makes clear, numbers games
are relevant to the prima facie determination, but they are not, nor
19 8
should they be, in and of themselves determinative.
There are two major problems with setting up absolute tests
based only on numbers. First, setting down absolute quantifiable
standards completely discredits the ability of trial judges to determine the existence of a prima facie case from all the relevant evidence; but, as the Batson Court appropriately recognized, it is trial
judges who are both present during voir dire and experienced in
conducting it.199 Morever, these "numbers games" ignore many
other relevant factors such as: the prosecutor's questions and general conduct during voir dire; 20 0 any readily apparent reason for the
20 1
strikes arising from jurors' answers to questions during voir dire;
197 For example, challenges for cause and just plain "luck of the draw" will affect how
the percentage of blacks on the venire corresponds to the percentage on the jury.
198 That is not to say that a trial judge may never find a prima facie case of discrimination based on numbers alone. There may be cases in which the sheer number of peremptories exercised against blacks raises an inference of discrimination, and an
appellate court should not lightly overturn a trial judge's finding of a prima facie case
based on such a blatant use of peremptories.
199 476 U.S. at 97.
200 The Supreme Court specifically listed this a factor in Batson. See id. at 96. This is
one of only two examples provided by the Supreme Court, the other being a "pattern"
of strikes exercised against members of defendant's racial group-i.e., the factor which
has played such a major role in the lower courts' focus on numbers games.
201 See Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1157-58 (Colo. 1987)(en banc); People v.
Hooper, 118 Ill. 2d 244, 247-48, 506 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Ill. 1987)(Ryan,J., specially
concurring); Commonwealth v. Gray, 356 S.E.2d 157, 170-71 (Va. 1987). Compare
United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Matthews,
803 F.2d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hawkins, 781 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11 th
Cir. 1986).
This extremely important factor is another reason that wide discretion should be
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whether it is apparent from voir dire that there are unchallenged
white jurors who have backgrounds essentially similar to excluded
black jurors;20 2 and the historical or habitual striking of blacks. 203
Second, any absolute test based on numbers insulates a certain
amount of discrimination in jury selection unless the standard is so
lax as to render the Batson prima facie case requirement meaningless. For example, a rule declaring that the peremptory challenge of
three blacks constitutes a prima facie case, irrespective of any other
factors, would encourage the prosecutor to discriminate on the basis
of race at least twice. Setting up a strict numerical standard is
equivalent to telling the prosecutor how much racial discrimination
the court will accept. On the other hand, setting the standard too
low-for example, one peremptory strike of a member of defendant's racial group-will obliterate the role of the prima facie case.
Moreover, absolute standards, whether too high or too low, effectively divest trial judges of the broad discretion envisioned in Batson.
The preceding illustration is very simple, but it reflects the same
problems inherent in the use of any absolute test based solely on
statistical information.
There is, perhaps, one type of numbers game which a court may
justifiably use not just as a factor but as an absolute test. A numerically based standard which is absolute in just one direction avoids
some of the aforementioned problems. A "one-way" standard
means that if certain numerical evidence reaches a predefined quantum, it automatically raises an inference of intentional discrimination, mandating an inquiry into the motives underlying the
prosecutor's use of peremptories. On the other hand, a trial judge
is not precluded from finding a prima facie case when the prosecutor stays below the "trigger" level. In this way, courts can avoid the
problem of inadvertently creating an "acceptable" level of racial
discrimination.

20 4

vested in trial judges. Setting up absolute tests effectively removes this discretion by
taking away their ability to assess other relevant factors arising during voir dire.
202 See Gray, 356 S.E.2d at 171 ("Significantly, the Commonwealth's Attorney also peremptorily struck two white jurors who, during voir dire, expressed similar uncertainty
about imposing the death penalty.").
203 See United States v. Matthews, 803 F.2d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1986)("The [District]
[C]ourt noted that there was no evidence that the prosecution had maintained a pattern
or practice of striking blacks from juries in cases where the defendants are black, and
further commented that the Court's personal experience showed the contrary.").
204 Alleviating the problem of insulating "some" racial discrimination can occur only
if the "one-way" test works to the defendant's advantage. A numbers game which is
"one-way" but instead works to the prosecutor's advantage-such as "solitaire," in
which the leaving of one black on the jury automatically precludes a prima facie casemagnifies rather than alleviates the problem of creating a minimally acceptable level of
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The courts playing "Going, Going, Gone" are employing this
type of "one-way" standard by ruling that the total exclusion from
the jury of all members of defendant's racial group automatically
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination. 20 5 These courts,
however, have not ruled that leaving one member of the relevant
group on the jury precludes such an inference. Of course, "oneway" tests, even those working only to the benefit of defendants,
still improperly remove discretion from the trial judge, as well as the
opportunity for the judge to consider other relevant evidence. Perhaps "one-way" tests recognize that in some special situations, this
loss of discretion is justified by either the high probability that discrimination exists or the magnitude of the harm caused if discrimination has, in fact, occurred. 20 6 In such situations, perhaps a trial
judge should exercise an abundance of caution and err on the side
of inquiring into the prosecutor's motives.
3.
a.

Reviewing the Prima Fade Case

The Record on Appeal

If the trial judge expressly decides that the defendant has not
established an inference of purposeful discrimination, or implicitly
so decides simply by refusing to inquire into the prosecutor's motives, 20 7the defendant has the burden of preserving a record sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. 20 8 Thus, several courts
have effectively placed on the defendant an affirmative duty to ensure that a transcript of voir dire is made. 20 9 In a Wyoming case,
racial discrimination. For example, in "solitaire," courts will tolerate any amount of
racial discrimination short of excluding from the jury all members of defendant's racial
group. See supra notes 157-65 notes accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
207 Of course, if the trial judge does inquire into the prosecutor's motives, it is extremely unlikely that the government could ever challenge the judge's decision that defendant successfully established a prima fade case.. Either the reasons provided will be
unacceptable to the judge, in which case the judge will institute an immediate remedy,
such as reseating the juror of summoning a new venire, or the reason will be acceptable,
in which case the appellate court will review the trial court's ultimate determination,
rather than its preliminary "prima facie" determination. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text, discussing the appellate tendency to ignore the reviewing of the prima
fade case decision if the prosecutor's explanation of his use of peremptories is on the
record.
208 Esquivel v. McCotter, 791 F.2d 350, 351 (5th Cir. 1986); Swain v. State, 504 So. 2d
at 350; Clay v. State, 716 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Ark. 1986); People v. Morales, 126 A.D. 836,
836-37, 510 N.Y.S.2d 756, 756-57 (1987); Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132,
1134 (Wyo. 1986).
209 See Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d at 1134; Morales, 126 A.D.2d at 836-37, 510 N.Y.S.2d
at 756-57; Swain, 504 So. 2d at 350.
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Bueno-Hernandez v. State,2 10the defendant, a Mexican national, argued that the government discriminatorily removed Mexican-Americans from his jury. 21 1 Although the prosecutor peremptorily struck
three potential jurors with Spanish surnames, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming ruled that defendant's failure to request that voir dire be
recorded resulted in a wholly insufficient record on which to base a
2 12
finding that those stricken belonged to defendant's racial group.
Certainly, an appellate court lacking a transcript of voir dire should
never overrule the factual findings of a trial judge who observed voir
21 3
dire first-hand.
In addition to supplying the appellate court with a transcript of
voir dire, the defendant should also make a record of the "numbers" relevant to raising an inference of intentional discrimination.
In order to sufficiently review whether the defendant established
this inference, appellate courts are requiring the record to contain
information regarding the number of defendant's minority group
on the venire and the number serving on the actual jury. 21 4 Again,
these are factors readily apparent to the trial judge, and appellate
courts may simply defer to the judge's "no prima facie case" finding
if defendant fails to put those factors in the record.
b.

The Standard of Review

In Batson, the Supreme Court specifically refrained from comprehensively listing factors relevant to a finding of purposeful discrimination, 21 5 entrusting the matter to the nation's trial judges.
The Court stated: "We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination ... ,"216 The Supreme
Court's confidence in trial judges suggests that great deference
should be accorded to their factual determinations that a defendant
21 7
has or has not raised an inference of intentional discrimination.
210 724 P.2d 1132.
211 Id. at 1134.
212 Id. Such a finding is, of course, necessary to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
213 See Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d at 1134-35; Swain, 504 So. 2d at 350.
214 Clay v. State, 716 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Ark. 1986); Lasley v. State, 505 So. 2d 1257,
1262-63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
215 476 U.S. at 96-97.
216 Id. at
217 If the

97.
trial judge determines that the defendant has raised the necessary inference,
the "prima facie" issue is unlikely to merit appellate review. In the event that the prosecutor comes forward with acceptable reasons for exercising his peremptory strikes, review will most likely focus only on an assessment of those reasons as they relate to the
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Although the circuits have not expressly applied a clearly erroneous standard of review to a trial judge's initial finding of an inference of discrimination, 2 18 appellate courts have reviewed the trial
court's ultimate determination of whether the defendant has or has
not proven intentional discrimination pursuant to this extremely
deferential standard. 21 9
This standard is consistent with the
Supreme Court's view in Batson that a trial judge's ultimate finding
regarding intentional discrimination will turn primarily on his evaluation of the neutrality and credibility of the prosecutor's reasons. 2 20
Whether the defendant has initially established a prima facie case
likewise turns on an evaluation, peculiarly within the trial judge's
expertise, of factors readily apparent to him during voir dire. 22 1 In
light of the Supreme Court's expression of confidence in trial courts
to properly determine the existence of a prima facie case, an appellate court should overturn that determination only if it is clearly
erroneous.
c.

Super Deference

Although appellate courts must give great deference to the trial
judge's findings regarding the establishment of a prima facie case
and uphold those findings unless dearly erroneous, in many cases
courts are not subjecting this initial finding to any meaningful review. 2 22 Only a finding that the defendant has successfully raised an
ultimate issue of intentional discrimination. In other words, once the reasons are on the
record, it is unlikely that the appellate court will review the trial judge's initial "prima

fade" determination. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
218 Perhaps this is due to the appellate court's seeming lack of interest in reviewing
the "prima fade case" issue whenever the prosecutor's reasons for exercising the relevant peremptories appear in the record.
219 See United States v. Cloyd, 819 F.2d 836, 837-38 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Love, 815 F.2d 53, 55 (8th
Cir. '1987); United States v. Matthews, 803 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1986).
220 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
221 See People v. Hooper, 118 Ill. 2d 244, 247-48, 506 N.E.2d 1305, 1306
(1987) (Ryan, J., specially concurring) (recognizing that a judge's refusal to inquire into
the motivations underlying the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes may be due to
reasons not readily apparent to those who, unlike the judge, were not present at voir
dire).
222 Review of the prima facie case determination occurs primarily when the trial judge
has found that the defendantfailed to raise an inference of discrimination. The following
chart exemplifies the various states in which a Batson issue reaches the appellate courts
for review.
Ultimate Ruling (After inquiry into
Prima Facie Ruling: Has an inference
prosecutor's motives) Has purposeful
been raised?
racial discrimination been shown?
1. No
2. Yes
No (Motives Valid)
3. Yes
Yes (Motives Invalid)
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inference of intentional discrimination requires the prosecutor to
reveal the reasons underlying her use of peremptory challenges.
Once the prosecutor's reasons appear in the record, however, appellate review has focused exclusively on those reasons, completely
ignoring the issue of whether the defendant established a prima facie case in the first place.2 23 Thus, in United States v. Woods, 224 the

Fourth Circuit stated: "[We] may examine [the prosecutor's] reasons under Batson, and we may leave for another day the question of
whether the defendant made out a prima facie case." 225 At first
glance, this approach makes good practical sense, because, as the
Fifth Circuit recognized in United States v. Forbes,22 6 once the trial
judge has heard the prosecutor's motives underlying the peremptory strikes and made an ultimate determination of whether those
strikes reflect intentional discrimination, appellate review should
In the third situation, there is no need for appellate review because the defendant
has prevailed on his Batson motion. The trial judge will impose the remedy before trial
in accordance with Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24., and no harm will befall defendant.
In the second situation, the review will focus on the trial court's ultimate ruling.
Therefore, the government receives no meaningful review of the trial judge's initial finding of the relevant inference.
Only in the first situation will the prima facie determination receive meaningful appellate review. Thus, appellate review of the trial judge's initial finding regarding the
prima facie case is responsive only to defendants.
223 See, e.g., Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010; Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir.
1987); United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir. 1987); Matthews, 803 F.2d
at 332. See also Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d at 1135 (assuming that defendant established
a prima facie case and reviewing prosecutor's explanation); Branch v. State, No.6 Div.
93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)(LEXIS, States Library)(assuming, like the trial judge,
that defendant established a prima facie case, thereby permitting review of prosecutor's
explanations).
The Seventh Circuit may have ignored the prima facie case requirement in Matthews
for good reasons. The trial occurred prior to the Batson decision, but Batson applied
retroactively to the case. Thus, it is not surprising that the trial judge, failing to anticipate the Batson procedural requirements, inquired into the prosecutor's motives without
first finding that defendant had raised an inference of purposeful discrimination. Because there was no prima facie determination for the court to review and there was an
acceptable reason for its absence, the Seventh Circuit was probably correct in ignoring
it. Therefore, the precedential value of Matthews on this issue is questionable. Or, perhaps Matthews represents an exception to this Article's proposal that the appellate courts
should actively review the trial court's prima facie case findings.
224 812 F.2d 1483 (4th Cir. 1987).
225 Id. at 1487. Ironically, the trial judge in Woods found that the defendant failed to
raise an inference of intentional discrimination but "allowed" the government to explain
its use of peremptories. This, of course, was no favor to the prosecutor as it undercut
the peremptory nature of his strikes and subjected his explanation to appellate review,
neither of which would have occurred had the trial judge faithfully adhered to the Batson
procedures. Accord Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1008-10. Fortunately for the government, in both
Forbes and Woods, the reviewing court upheld the trial judge's ultimate finding that the
defendant had not proved intentional discrimination.
226 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1987).
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not become bogged down on the issue of whether the defendant
made a prima facie showing.2 27 It seems petty to require appellate
court review of prima facie determinations when the record contains
all the evidence necessary to review the ultimate Batson question of
whether racial discrimination impermissibly influenced the selection
of the jury.
Good reasons exist, however, for reviewing the trial court's initial finding of a prima facie case. First and foremost, the absence of
meaningful review threatens to render the prima facie case requirement impotent, yet Batson expressly mandates that a court should
not require the prosecutor to reveal his motives for exercising peremptory strikes unless and until the defendant has raised an inference of intentional discrimination. 228 In this way, Batson delicately
accommodates competing interests, balancing the historical role of
the peremptory challenge against the prevention of racial discrimi-,
nation injury selection. The prima facie case requirement is exactly
that aspect of Batson which protects the peremptory nature of the
challenge. Emasculation of the prima facie case tips the Batson balance, interfering with the prosecutor's interest in exercising truly
peremptory challenges even in situations where Batson expressly left
peremptory strikes "unregulated"-when the defendant has failed
to raise an inference of intentional discrimination.
Appellate disregard of the prima facie case sends trial judges a
message inconsistent with the express language of Batson, encouraging apathy toward the prima facie threshold.2 29 Suppose the defendant utterly fails to establish a prima facie case based on the
prosecutor's conduct during voir dire, but the trial court, disregard227 Id. at 1010. The court based its decision in Forbes on holdings from Title VII juris-

prudence. Title VII jurisprudence, however, does not involve the delicate balancing of
rights involved in Batson and is, therefore, not persuasive. See infra notes 228-35 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the "Batson balance" as it relates to appellate re-

view of the prima facie case requirement.
228 476 U.S. at 96-97.
229 Indeed, some trial judges have "required" prosecutors to explain their use of peremptories, even after expressly finding that the defendant failed to raise the requisite
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1009; United States v.
Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir. 1987); Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d at 1134-35.

Other trial judges have virtually ignored the prima fade case issue by requiring a
prosecutorial explanation on little evidence of purposeful discrimination. See United
States v. Cloyd, 819 F.2d 836, 837 (8th Cir. 1987)(one black excluded); United States v.
Love, 815 F.2d 53, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1987)(one black excluded); Minnifield v. State, No.6
Div. 129, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (LEXIS, States library)(three blacks remaining

on jury).
Other trial judges have made no prima facie finding, merely assuming for the sake
of argument that defendant raised the relevant inference. See Branch v. State, No.6 Div.
93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)(LEXIS, States library).
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ing Batson, inquires into the prosecutor's motives and decides that
racial factors did impermissibly influence the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptories. 230 The tension is apparent: racial discrimination
has occurred, but the discrimination would have gone undetected
had the trial judge adhered to the Supreme Court's prima facie case
requirement. The resolution is easy if one views Batson as an uncompromising attempt to eliminate racially discriminatory jury selection practices at any cost. Such a reading, however, would
require a prosecutor to explain every single peremptory challenge
of a member of the defendant's racial group, regardless of the absence of any evidence raising an inference of discrimination. Not
only would this approach directly contradict the procedures expressly set forth in Batson, it would effectively eliminate the peremptory striking of certain jurors in cases involving minority defendants.
Moreover, setting up an obviously different procedure for striking
blacks than for striking whites actually highlights any racial aspects
of the case and calls the prospective jurors' attention to the role race
might play in a criminal case, be it jury selection, crediting of testimony, or jury deliberation. 23 ' It would be a tragic irony if the Batson
procedures, instead of promoting colorblindness in jury selection
specifically, and in criminal trials generally, were perverted, thereby
increasing the awareness of race during the course of a criminal
trial.
Of course, stringently applying the prima facie case require23 2
ment will result in the insulation of some racial discrimination,
but if the defendant cannot even raise an inference of discrimination, it is unlikely that he will ultimately prevail. Thus, most of this
"insulated" discrimination is nonremediable. Even in cases in
which it is remediable, such as the hypothetical illustration in the
previous paragraph, the Supreme Court has already struck the bal230 The only difference between this hypothetical illustration and what actually occurred in Woods and Forbes is that, after expressly finding that no inference of discrimination had been raised, but nevertheless inquiring into the prosecutor's motives, the trial
judges in Woods and Forbes made an ultimate finding of "no discrimination." See Woods,
812 F.2d at 1487; Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1009.
The situation in this illustration will rarely occur, but it is an example that best
reflects the tensions which, as this Article proposes, Batson has already resolved.
231 Certainly, the Batson procedures already have this effect, but to a much less significant degree provided the prima facie case is allowed to play its proper role. Obliteration
of the prima facie case would make this Batson-mandated "unequal" treatment of prospective jurors startlingly more obvious to those eventually selected to hear the case.
232 Compare, for example, the insulation of discrimination which would occur if
courts reject the use of determinative numbers games in judging whether the defendant
has made out a prima facie case. Of course, the adoption of those numbers games
would have an even more deleterious effect on the "insulation" of discrimination. See
supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
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ance in Batson: "Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing,
the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." 23 3 Furthermore, the very next
sentence in the opinion expresses concern that such an explanation
imposes a limitation on "the full peremptory character of the historic challenge." 23 4 It would be anomalous to conclude that the institution of the peremptory challenge played no role in the Court's
careful articulation of the requirements of a prima facie case. A
modicum of remediable racial discrimination must go undetected,
because the Supreme Court has decided it must, in deference to the
interests served by the peremptory challenge. 23 5 Thus, when employing Batson procedures, trial judges should cautiously accord the
prima facie case requirement its proper status.
B.

THE PROSECUTOR'S EXPLANATION-DISCRIMINATION WITH A
THOUSAND DISGUISES?

Once the defendant raises an inference of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the inference
with a racially neutral explanation for peremptorily striking members of defendant's racial group. 23 6 In practice, however, this is not
a difficult burden, as trial judges accept virtually any explanation
proffered. This outcome was forecast by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Batson: "Any prosecutor can easily assert facially
neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped
to second-guess those reasons." 23 7 A prosecutor can too easily explain away intentional discrimination with pretextual reasons,
thereby upseting Batson's subtle balance between the peremptory
nature of the challenge and racial discrimination. 23 8 Magnifying this
danger, trial court findings on this issue turn largely on evaluations
233

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

234 Id.
235 It will, of course, be a rare case in which the defendant can establish purposeful
discrimination subsequent to a prosecutor's explanation when, prior thereto, the defendant could not even raise an inference of such discrimination. Therefore, this remediable yet undetected discrimination is a small price to pay for the trial courts' faithful
implementation of the Batson procedures, which so carefully balance important countervailing interests.
236 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. Once the prosecutor has rebutted the inference, the
trial court must decide if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at
98. Thus, the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination remains with the
defendant. Failure on the part of the prosecutor to come forward with racially neutral
motives, however, will result in a finding that the government has not successfully rebutted the inference and that purposeful discrimination has occurred.
237 Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
238 Here, the threat is to the interest in preventing racial discrimination rather than to
the peremptory character of the challenge.
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of credibility. As such, they are entitled to great deference 23 9 and
240
will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.
1.

Acceptable Reasons-Prosecutors, Take Your Pick

The list of racially neutral reasons found to successfully rebut
an inference of discrimination is quite lengthy. All these reasons
can be placed in one of two broad categories: objectively verifiable
reasons generally of the same type that lead to challenges for cause
on the basis of bias or other grounds; or primarily subjective reasons of the type which lead to peremptory challenges based on
unarticulable gut feelings. The latter category merits special concern because it consists of reasons which are both the essence of the
peremptory challenge and the most likely pretext for racial discrimination. 24 1 Nevertheless, both types of explanation are widely accepted by trial judges.
Explanations falling in the first category and deemed valid include: the juror had a close relative recently charged with or convicted of a crime; 242 the juror was previously represented by, or
acquainted with, defense counsel; 243 the juror or relatives of the ju239 "Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely
will turn on an evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1985)).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Matthews, 803
F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Love, 815 F.2d 53, 55 (8th Cir.
1987)(trial court's determination that the government had rebutted defendant's prima
facie case entitled to great deference).
241 Herein lies the tension between the two competing interests which Batson attempts
to balance. If the prosecutor has revealed his reasons, defendant has necessarily established a prima facie case, provided the trial judge has correctly applied the Batson procedures. Therefore, it makes sense at this stage of the analysis to tilt the balance in favor
of purging the jury selection process of racial discrimination. That is, because the prima
facie case, which is the aspect of Batson that zealously guards the peremptory character
of the challenge, has already been established and the inquiry into prosecutorial motives
executed, the judge should take a long, hard look at the reasons proffered, questioning
the prosecutor if necessary. Intrusion on the peremptory nature of the challenge makes
little sense if no benefit in the form of discovering racial discrimination is derived
therefrom.
242 United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (juror's brother in
prison for a robbery conviction); Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010 (juror's two sons had been in
trouble with the law); United States v. Gartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987)(juror's brother had been convicted of robbery); Ricks v. State, No. 6 Div. 45, slip op. (Ala.
Grim. App. Feb. 24, 1987)(LEXIS, States library)(uror had nephew charged with robbery); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 686 (Del. 1986)(uror's son convicted of murder,
but successfully avoided death penalty).
243 United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987)(juror knew defendant's lawyer who had done work for an agency with which juror was associated);
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ror were about the same age as the defendant; 2 44 the juror had past
legal problems with the Government; 24 5 the juror's responses during voir dire indicated a hesitancy to consider relevant evidence or
to apply the relevant law; 24 6 the juror's occupation was too technical

to avoid a hypertechnical consideration of the elements of the
crime; 24 7 the juror was familiar with persons or places involved in
the case;2 48 the juror was young, single, unemployed, or poor;24 9
United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1986)(uror previously had been
represented by one of defense attorneys).
244 Ricks, No. 6, Div. 45, slip op. (two jurors were about the same age as the defendant
and might identify with him); Minnifield v. State, No. 6, Div. 129 slip op. at (Ala. Crim.
App. Feb. 10, 1987)(LEXIS, States library) (two jurors had sons about the same age as
defendant; Branch v. State, No. 6, Div. 93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)(LEXIS, States
library) juror was about the same age as defendant and a possible "sister figure").
It is interesting to note thatJustice Marshall specifically regarded this motivation for
striking a juror as "too-easy" a means of explaining peremptories on non-racial
grounds. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
245 United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986)ouror with prior
problems with the Internal Revenue Service excluded from case where defendant was
charged with obstruction of IRS proceeding).
246 Matthews, 803 F.2d at 331 (juror gave hesitant responses to inquiries regarding her
ability to consider admissible government evidence in the form of covertly taped conversations); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 685 (Del. 1986) (one juror unreceptive to imposition of death penalty; one juror referred to the alleged murder as an "accident"). See
also Branch v. State, No. 6, Div. 93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 1986)(LEXIS,
States library) juror excluded for, among other things, giving much more favorable responses to defense counsel than to prosecutor).
247 People v. Morales, 510 N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (neglecting to reveal
the occupations of the two excluded black jurors); Funches v. State, 518 So.2d 781, 783
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987)(LEXIS, States library)juror was a teacher, and prosecutor "always strike[s] all teachers"); Branch v. State, No. 6 Div. 93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App.
1986)(LEXIS, States library) (uror was a scientist, and prosecutor did not want a "scientific application in the decision").
248 United States v. Cloyd, 819 F.2d 836, 837 (8th Cir. 1987)juror familiar with location the defendant was expected to use as an alibi); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d
521, 525 (8th Cir. 1986)(uror lived in same neighborhood as person who was involved
in case but who was not charged); Ricks v. State, No. 6 Div. 45, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App.
Feb. 24, 1987), cert. denied, (Sept. 11, 1987)(LEXIS, States library)(juror "may have
known" defendant or defendant's family); State v. Weatherspoon, 719 S.W.2d 304, 307
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1986)(jurors acquainted with people involved in case).
249 United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987)(juror who had
severe financial condition excluded because of potential identification with the defendant who was charged with drug distribution); Funches v. States, 518 So.2d 781, 783
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
If this reason is acceptable, prosecutors apparently can use it in any case in which
the defendant is charged with an economic crime, such as robbery, burglary, or drug
distribution. The rationale, though tenuous, appears to be that persons with no job or
low income employment will identify with dangerous criminals who share the juror's
financial situation. The potential for such reasoning to serve as a pretext for racial discrimination is great. Moreover, this is an especially sensitive area because this motive
will certainly have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities whose younger members suffer disproportionately from unemployment. See infra notes 293-301 and accom-
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the juror had a language problem, was hard of hearing, or had similar perceptual difficulty; 2 50 and the juror subscribed to a black newspaper which had been very pro-defendant in its coverage of a highly
25 1
publicized case.
Prosecutorial explanations which are less tangible, less objectively verifiable, more a product of a hunch, and yet are still valid
according to this nation's appellate courts include: the juror had a
poor attitude; 2 52 the juror appeared disinterested; 2 53 the juror
seemed unintelligent or "bewildered"; 2 54 the juror seemed hostile
toward the prosecutor;2 55 the juror avoided eye contact with the
panying text, discussing proffered peremptory explanations which have a disparate
impact on minorities.
250 Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1313 (American Indian juror peremptorily stricken because of
language problems); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 685-86 (Del. 1986)(juror hard of
hearing). The Tenth Circuit in Chalan, noting that the juror with language problems
could have been successfully challenged for cause, treated the situation as if she had
been so challenged. 812 F.2d at 1313-14.
251 Woods, 812 F.2d at 1485 (juror probably exposed to what prosecutor believed was
unfair, inflammatory, and racial pretrial publicity).
252 Vaccaro, 816 F.2d at 457 (juror had a poor attitude, according to prosecutor, in
answering voir dire questions).
253 Matthews, 803 F.2d at 331 (juror showed a "lack of commitment to the importance
of this proceeding"); Funches v. States, 518 So.2d 781, 783 (Ala. Grim. App.) (three
jurors removed, each partially because of "nonconcern [for] what was going on"); Ricks
v. State, No. 6, Div. 45, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 1987), cert. denied, (Sept. 11,
1987)(LEXIS, States library)(juror was "inattentive").
254 United States v. Hawkins, 781 F.2d 1483, 1485-86 (11 th Cir. 1986)(juror, a manual laborer, was "unsuitable" for complex white collar crime case); Baynard v. State, 518
A.2d 682, 685-86 (Del. 1986)(juror seemed "stupid" and might have difficulty understanding evidence); Branch v. State, No. 6 Div. 93, slip op. (Ala. Grim. App. Nov. 12,
1986)(LEXIS, States library)(juror had "dumb-founded, bewildered" look on her face).
255 Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010-11 (prosecutor sensed that juror felt hostile to being in
court because of her posture and demeanor and feared that she might respond adversely
to the government simply because the government called her to jury duty); Matthews,
803 F.2d at 331 (juror was examining prosecutor in a hostile manner). In Matthews, the
prosecutor stated for the record:
My last strike as I mentioned a few moments ago, was Mr. Robinson. I believe that
is his name, Declinton Robinson. The reason why I struck him is [admittedly a
personal] one. I don't know what is going to happen to me if I put this on the
record, but I am going to anyway because the Court needs to know my reasons.
Mr. Declinton was sitting directly to my right, only a space of approximately
four feet from me, and both yesterday and today he spent a very great deal of time
in examining me in a way which I felt was in the end becoming rather hostile. Now,
I realize that this is a subjective judgment, but it was very marked to me, Judge. It
was something that I noticed and felt was rude for one thing, and indicated one of
two things, either he was going to be very strongly in support of my position or he
was going to be very strongly against my position. Under those circumstances I felt
that there were other jurors who more fit the profile of ajuror that I was looking for.
Id. Clearly, this is exactly the type of easily generated explanation that greatly concerned Justice Marshall. It could easily mask racial discrimination, yet, it exemplifies the
essence of the peremptory challenge.
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prosecutor; 25 6 the juror seemed nervous and/or indecisive; 25 7 the
juror may have trouble getting along with other jurors;2 58 and the
juror was known to be anti-law enforcement from previous experience. 25 9 From this lengthy list of valid prosecutorial justifications, it
is apparent that any thoughtful prosecutor can sufficiently disguise
racial discrimination with racially-neutral reasons, unless the trial
judge engages in a careful inquiry designed to detect intentional racial discrimination. Meaningful evaluation of the prosecutor's explanation requires employing some of the "tests" applied by courts
in those rare cases ruling that the government's explanation of peremptories fell short of rebutting the inference of intentional
discrimination.
2. Running the Gauntlet of Invalidity
Those few courts which have made an ultimate finding of intentional racial discrimination have done so for one of three basic reasons: the prosecutor's explanation is insufficiently specific; 2 60 the

prosecutor's explanation is not racially neutral; 2 61 or the prosecutor's explanation is not bona fide but is instead a pretext for racial
discrimination. 26 2 Apparently, then, avoiding these three pitfalls is
all the prosecutor need do in order to prevent a finding of inten26 3
tional discrimination.
256 United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987). The prosecutor
stated for the record during jury selection: "[U]nlike the other jurors selected by the
Government, she avoided eye contact with the prosecutor. As a personal preference,
eye contact is highly valued as a jury selection technique." Id.
257 United States v. Hawkins, 781 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1986)(uror nervous
about making an important decision).
258 Branch v. State, No. 6 Div. 93, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 1986)(LEXIS,
States library)(juror appeared to be a gruff debt collector who prosecutor feared might
be at odds with others on the jury).
259 Minnifield v. State, No. 6, Div. 129, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 10,
1987)(LEXIS, States library)(juror previously served on a jury which returned a criminally negligent homicide conviction on a murder charge); People v. Morales, 510
N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)(juror considered unfavorable to prosecution based
on government's experience with her in prior jury service); Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d
1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986)(Juror "known to our office to be... anti-law enforcement.").
260 Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1314; Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Conn.
1986); People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 725, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 664, 726 P.2d 102,
110 (1986) (finding prosecutor's reason insufficiently specific pursuant to a state constitutional analysis which was developed prior to Batson and which operated in essentially
the same manner as the Batson procedures).
261 United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1987); Clark v. Bridgeport,
645 F. Supp. 890, 893-94, 898 (D. Conn. 1986).
262 Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir. 1987); State v. Gilmore, 103 NJ.
508, 542-43, 511 A.2d 1150, 1168 (1986)(finding prosecutor's explanation "pretextual"
under a state constitutional analysis essentially similar to the Batson analysis).
263 Unless, because of the prosecutor's conduct or manner of exercising peremptories
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Specificity

The basis for the requirement that the prosecutor's explanation be "clear and reasonably specific" comes directly from the Batson decision. 2 64 The Court stated that the prosecutor may not rebut
the defendant's prima facie case merely by denying the existence of
a discriminatory motive or by generally proclaiming good faith. 26 5
It is not surprising that courts consistently have rejected such gen2 66
eral denials.
Explanations which lack sufficient specificity are not limited to
the general denials mentioned in Batson. In United States v. Chalan,267
the Tenth Circuit ruled that the following explanation was not sufficiently specific: "[B]ased upon his background and other things in
his questionnaire, I just elected to strike him." 268 Interestingly, the
prosecutor in Chalan gave this "explanation" in the course of a preBatson trial. 2 69 It is unlikely that any intelligent prosecutor would

provide such an insufficient explanation or just a general denial of
racial discrimination in cases tried subsequent to Batson.2 70 The
specificity requirement is therefore unlikely to impose a significant
barrier to racial discrimination for any but the most dull-witted
prosecutor.
during voir dire, the inference of intentional discrimination is so strong in a particular
case that the government's reasons, though apparently valid when considered independently, simply cannot rebut the inference.
264 476 U.S. at 98 n.20.
265 Id. at 98. The Court explained: "If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause 'would be but a vain
and illusory requirement.'" Id. (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)).
266 See, e.g., Acres v. State, No. 3, Div. 843, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 10,
1987)(LEXIS, States library)(prosecutor claimed that he exercised strikes in good faith
and not along racial lines); State v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 501, 505 (N.M. Ct. App.
1987)(denial of racial motive only); Ricks v. State, No. 6, Div. 45, slip op. (Ala. Crim.
App. Feb. 24, 1987)(LEXIS, States library) (with respect to one challenged juror, prosecutor said only: "I do not strike them because of race, Your Honor."); Williams v. State,
507 So. 2d 50, 52-53 (Miss. 1987)(prosecutor merely denied that strikes were motivated
by race).
267 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
268 Id. at 1314.
269 Id.
270 All the cases in which the trial court found general denials insufficient, see cases
cited supra note 266, were likewise tried prior to the Batson decision.
Perhaps the absence of any decisions finding post-Batson explanations insufficiently
specific is a reflection of the fact that if such an explanation is offered, the trial judge will
reject it, either requiring more information or concluding that the prosecutor has not
rebutted the inference of racial discrimination. Either order likely will be unpublished,
and, in the latter case, the trial judge will impose a remedy immediately with no interlocutory appeal.
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Racially Neutral

According to Batson, once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with a neutral explanation for peremptorily challenging members of
defendant's racial group. 27 1 Certainly, in this context, "neutral"
means "racially-neutral. '2 72 Although a seemingly simple concept,
the definition of racially-neutral is amorphous.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Brown 273 should have had
no difficulty deciding that the prosecutor's explanation utterly failed
to achieve racial neutrality. The prosecutor explained that he had
peremptorily challenged all the blacks because the defense attorney,
a black state senator, had a very special appeal to blacks in the community. 2 74 This explanation is patently racial, and the court, in
eventually concluding that the prosecutor impermissibly excluded
the jurors, relied on Batson's express language: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the [prosecutor's] case against a black defendant." 2 75 Although this Batson quote
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
There are no published opinions attributing to the term "neutral" any meaning
other than "racially-neutral." Moreover, the Supreme Court derived the Batson analysis
from those earlier Supreme Court cases concerning racial discrimination in venire selection in which "neutral" expressly meant "racially-neutral." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95
(citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
273 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987).
274 Id. at 675-76. The prosecutor told the trial court:
It wasn't racist on my part to excuse those particular jurors; but I think, in all
candidness [sic], I've tried cases with Mr. Porter before, and I think he's a marvelous
opponent. He's very good in everything, and he also had a very special appeal to
the black people in the community.
And the one trial that I can think that we had together that actually went to
trial, Judge Smith got kind of worn out with Mr. Porter and myself and said, "Men,
I'm worn out with you two. I want you to take the first twelve jurors and not excuse
anybody," which we did. There were six black and six white jurors on that case. It
was a robbery, and it appeared to me an open and shut case. The man was caught
there with the purse and the money and everything. We had a hungjury in the case,
six to six, along the racial lines.
And so all I'm telling the Court is that I did take into consideration the fact that
these people were black and that almost everybody-I would think they [sic] would
be an incompetent juror, almost, if they were from this area and didn't know Senator Porter. And I had planned on excusing them if they indicated in any way that
they either knew Melvin Porter or knew who he was.
Id.
275 Id. at 676 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89). See also, Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645
F. Supp. 890, 893-94, 898 (D. Conn. 1986). In Clark, the court extended the Batson
procedures to a civil case in which black plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against the
local municipal government and the defendant municipality exercised its peremptories to
strike all the potential blackjurors. Id. at 895-96. Regardless of whether this extension
of Batson was appropriate, the case provides an example of the type of motive con271
272
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appears to foreclose the possibility of a contrary ruling in Brown, the
Tenth Circuit's decision was not quite so simple. The complication
arises because of an internal inconsistency in Batson. In one place,
the Supreme Court merely forbade prosecutors from challenging
jurors solely on account of race, 27 6 but elsewhere in the Batson opinion, the Court required prosecutors' motives to be racially neutral. 2 77 Although "racially neutral" implies that race should play no
role in a prosecutor's motive for peremptorily challenging jurors,
the prohibition of challenges "solely based on race" connotes the
existence of acceptable explanations based partly on race.
A closer examination of Brown highlights this contradiction.
The prosecutor previously had lost what he considered to be an
"open and shut" criminal case against a black defendant represented by the same lawyer who was now defending Brown. 2 78 Ac27 9
cording to the prosecutor, the jury split 6-6 along racial lines.
Thus, although the prosecutor did not strike the blacks for purely
race-neutral reasons, he specifically tailored his strikes to the case
demned in Batson. When asked to explain his challenges, the assistant city attorney
stated:
I prefer and thought that my client would get a much fairer trial if I could get people who came from surrounding circumstances and who had no feeling of kinship by
race, color or creed.... [I]t looks like a pervasive pattern, I can't deny that we did
it, I'm not going to sit here and say we did it, you know, but I'm sure if you had
twenty more blacks on that panel, we would have had to accept black people. We
would have to make a choice of which black people would we-would have given us
a better and fairer trial. For example, if I had a black person who lived in Fairfield
as compared to a black person who lived in Bridgeport on that panel, I probably
would have knocked the black person from Bridgeport off and retained the one
from Fairfield. Because the atmosphere that prevails in this city which I know exists,
that's it. I have no other defense. I knocked them off. Yes, I did. I used my peremptory challenges ..... But it's so terribly unfair to pick on one segment of the
population and tell us, oh, you were pervasive. It was designed. You knocked them
all off.... I can't give you any other argument. We did it. It's obvious what we
did.
Id. at 893 (elipses in original). The assistant city attorney also stated that he thought
black jurors would be biased, emphasizing that black plaintiffs were involved. Yet, he
made no effort to explore this suspected bias on voir dire. Finally, the city attorney
remarked:
[I]f I had a choice between a white juror and a black juror under the facts of these
cases, I'm going to take a white juror. That's what I'm saying.... [W]hy should I
put my city and my defendants at the mercy of the people in my opinion who make
the most civil rights claims, at least in my experience.... But I've been honest with
your Honor. I told you exactly why I kept those people off the jury.
Id. at 894 (elipses in original).
The Clark court had no trouble finding these reasons insufficient to rebut the inference of racial discrimination previously raised. Indeed, the city attorney in Clark excluded blacks for the exact reasons specifically condemned in Batson.
276 476 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 98, 100.
278 Brown, 817 F.2d at 675-76.
279 Id.
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against Brown and did not base them solely on the juror's race.
Rather, he looked to the juror's race plus previous experience with
the defense attorney's seeming influence over black jurors. An affinity between defense counsel and juror may in some cases justify a
challenge for cause, regardless of the juror's race. If such evidence
could, provided it was strong enough, support a challenge for cause,
a weaker showing of lawyer-juror affinity should serve as a proper
basis for a peremptory challenge. Simply because this "affinity" is a
result of, among other things, race, courts should not read Batson to
forbid a prosecutor the wise use of a peremptory challenge. To do
so would, in effect, sanction a juror's racial bias as a means of elimi28 0
nating prosecutorial racial bias.
The Tenth Circuit found the appropriate solution, ruling in
Brown that an affinity between a potential juror and defense counsel
is a justifiable reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, even
though that affinity is linked to race. 28 1 The prosecutor, however,
must bring out facts during voir dire which support such an affinity
and not assume that it exists solely because of racial identity. 28 2 Batson expressly condemned an assumption of juror bias based solely
on race. 28 3 The prosecutor in Brown failed to inquire into the black
juror's potential bias during voir dire, simply assuming from previous experience that all blacks would vote to acquit the defendant
28 4
because of the mere presence of the defense attorney.
The obvious implication of Brown is that "racially neutral" does
not and cannot mean absolute racial neutrality. The fact that juror
bias is linked to race should not make peremptory exclusion of that
280 It would be quite anomalous if, in order to prevent racial discrimination, courts
construed Batson to prevent prosecutors from challenging jurors who are themselves
racially biased. The Supreme Court has long recognized that racial bias may be subtle.

A peremptory challenge is a means of eliminating those jurors with particular biases and
prejudices, racial or otherwise, which may be so subtle as to allow that juror to evade a
challenge for cause, yet not so subtle as to have escaped the prosecutor's trained and

watchful eye.
281 Brown, 817 F.2d at 676. The court stated: "While [Batson] interdicts the exercise
of peremptory challenges for purely racial reasons, it does not forbid challenges of minority jurors for legitimate reasons tangentially connected with their race." According
to the court, specific juror bias is one such legitimate reason. Id.
282 Id.

283 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. The Court stated:
[The Equal Protection Clause] forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the
assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.... The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their
State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to
approve the exclusion ofjurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely
from the jurors' race.
Id. at 97-98.
284 Brown, 817 F.2d at 676.
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juror "taboo" under Batson. On the other hand, allowing a prosecutor to assume juror bias in any case based on broad and often stereotypical assumptions is exactly what the Supreme Court sought to
prevent in Batson. As the Tenth Circuit held in Brown, mere assumptions of race-linked juror bias will not suffice. A prosecutor, intending to exclude jurors because of a race-linked characteristic,
should lay a factual predicate during voir dire tending to show specific juror bias. 28 5 Otherwise, the prosecutor's exclusion of blacks is
overinclusive in relation to his "legitimate" motive, especially considering that there is a more precise alternative-attempting to expose that race-linked juror bias during voir dire. 28 6
The Fourth Circuit considered a similar non-neutral explanation in United States v. Woods, 2 8 7 where the prosecutor struck a black
juror for race-linked reasons. The defendant in Woods was a black
pastor in Charleston, South Carolina, who was charged with mail
fraud. 28 8 The charge received strong negative publicity, and the
prosecutor was aware of several anti-government articles in the
Charleston Chronicle, whose subscribers were primarily black. The
prosecutor challenged one black juror from Charleston ostensibly
because of assumed exposure to what the prosecutor considered racially inflammatory pretrial publicity. 28 9 Although the juror indicated on voir dire that he had seen some press stories, the
prosecutor made no further exploration into the issue of specific juror bias or the juror's news source. 290 Still, the trial judge found
that the defendant had not proven any purposeful racial discrimina29
tion, and the appellate court upheld the judge's determination. '
285 Of course, such a showing need not amount to the showing necessary to support a
challenge for cause.
286 For example, if a black juror is going to acquit a black defendant because of racial
affinity, that juror is certainly subject to a challenge for cause. What if, after voir dire,
the prosecutor could not establish the juror bias to the extent that it would support a
challenge for cause? Must she leave that juror on the panel, even though she honestly
feels that the juror will automatically vote for acquittal? Brown says "No." 817 F.2d at
676. However, removing blacks because they are black on the assumption that they will
be partial is overbroad in relation to the legitimate objective of removing those jurors
who may be biased and is a clear violation of Batson. The prosecutor should, as Brown
indicates, try to establish the specific juror bias on voir dire. This procedure is a much
less intrusive and more reasonable alternative than challenging a juror solely because of
assumptions predicated on juror race.
287 812 F.2d 1483, 1485-86 (4th Cir. 1987).
288 Id. at 1484.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 1487. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the deference that appellate courts
should give to the trial judge's findings, stating that those findings should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. The court also considered the fact that three blacks
served on the jury, a factor militating against the existence of purposeful discrimination.
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The result in Woods is clearly inconsistent with Brown. The
prosecutor in Woods assumed, solely because of the juror's race, that
he read the Charleston Chronicle, which prosecutor characterized as a
"black newspaper." This is precisely the type of assumption-based
solely on race and unsupported by voir dire testimony-which both
Batson and Brown condemned. The motive, though not "raciallyneutral," is legitimate according to Brown, 29 2 but the prosecutor did
not make a sufficient effort on voir dire to disclose the suspected
"race-linked" juror bias.
Presumably, the validity of race-linked rationales extends beyond those involved in Woods and Brown. Pursuant to Brown, the
government may strike a black juror who is biased in favor of a black
defendant, so long as the prosecutor does not merely assume juror
bias from the juror's race but brings out that bias via testimony and
demeanor during voir dire. Batson attempts to eliminate racial bias,
not condone it. Thus, Batson does not condemn exclusions based
on specific juror bias, but rather the assumption that the juror is biased merely because he shares the same race as the defendant. If
the juror is biased, even if that bias is racially based, he should be
subject to a peremptory challenge, provided the prosecutor raises
some evidence of that bias during voir dire. This is especially true
considering that the court may remove that juror for cause if the
prosecutor establishes the juror's bias to the trial judge's satisfaction. The implications of the preceding analysis are clear: "Racially-neutral" does not mean "racially-neutral." Virtually any
motive, race-linked or otherwise, will suffice to rebut defendant's
prima facie case if properly substantiated.
More troubling is an explanation by a prosecutor that is facially
neutral but which has a disparate impact on members of defendant's
racial group. Examples include peremptory challenges exercised
because the juror is unemployed, has a low income, or lacks sufficient education. At least the race-linked motives legitimatized in
Brown and Woods were rationally related to the existence of specific
juror bias; 29 3 but facially neutral explanations having a racially disparate impact often have, at best, a tenuous relationship to specific
juror bias.2 9 4 Moreover, these facially neutral reasons provide prosSee supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Woods,
812 F.2d 1483 (4th Cir. 1987). Brown, of course, unlike Woods, requires the prosecutor
to bring out evidence of this bias during voir dire. In other words, the prosecutor's
means of eliminating biased jurors are overbroad if the prosecutor does not make a
searching inquiry into that bias during voir dire.
294 Apparently, the rationale underlying challenges based on unemployment or low
income is that a juror might identify with a defendant who shares the same status or
292
293
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ecutors with a "cover" for racial discrimination, especially if the trial
is in a large city where the burden of unemployment, low income, or
poor education is likely to fall disproportionately upon minorities.
Thus, such facially neutral motives are inherently suspect of serving
as a pretext for intentional discrimination.
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the problems surrounding a "facially neutral, disparate impact" explanation in State
v. Gilmore.29 5 In Gilmore, the government anticipated that certain
Baptist ministers from the Newark area, including the defendant's
parents, would testify as alibi or character witnesses. After successfully removing all the black jurors, most by means of peremptories,
the prosecutor explained that he wanted to eliminate all Baptists
from the jury because of suspected bias. 296 Although membership
in the Baptist faith is generally racially neutral, 2 97 certain denominations prevalent in the North are predominately black, and therefore,
the exclusion of Baptists from defendant's Newark jury had a disparate impact on blacks.
The Gilmore court utilized the same analysis as the Tenth Circuit
in Brown.2 98 Indeed, a motive for exercising peremptories which has
a disparate impact on blacks is easily viewed as race-linked, thereby
suggesting application of the Brown analysis. The "assumption" fatal to the government's case in Brown also proved to be the prosecutor's downfall in Gilmore, but doubly so. The prosecutor assumed
both that all black venirepersons were Baptist and that black Baptists would be biased in favor of the defendant, yet he made no effort to verify these assumptions on voir dire.29 9 Thus, although the
prosecutor's ultimate motive behind the peremptories-removing
jurors with a specific bias-was both "legitimate" and trial-related,
his means were overbroad and therefore lacked any rationalrelation
300
to the particular case.
might even sympathize in a case in which the defendant is charged with an "economic"
crime, such as burglary, robbery, theft, or a homicide occurring during the course of one
of these crimes. See cases cited supra note 249.
295 103 NJ. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). Although Gilmore was based on the New
Jersey Constitution, the procedures outlined by the court were the same as the Batson
procedures. See id. at 1165-66 (citing Batson repeatedly).
296 Id. at 1168.
297 This Article does not address the question of whether Batson will be, or should be,
extended to discrimination on the basis of religion or sex.
298 Gilmore, 103 NJ. at 542-43, 511 A.2d at 1168. See supra notes 273-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Brown.
299 Gilmore, 103 NJ. at 542-43, 511 A.2d at 1168.
300 Id. The court stated:
Then there is the assistant prosecutor's attempt to justify his exclusion of Blacks as
a proxy for exclusion of Baptists, a religious group to whom he assumed Blacks
predominately belonged. Admittedly, given the assistant prosecutor's anticipation
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Courts can apply a similar analysis to any facially neutral reason
having a disparate impact on members of the defendant's minority
group. Take, for example, peremptories exercised on the basis of
unemployment, low income, or a lack of education. As previously
mentioned, these reasons create a special risk of discrimination not
only because of the likelihood of disparate impact, but because they
easily serve as a pretext for purposeful discrimination. They are far
less indicative of specific juror bias than the reasons offered in
Brown, Matthews, and Gilmore, and, unlike those somewhat unique explanations, can support peremptory strikes in virtually any criminal
case. Therefore, given that the defendant has already established a
prima facie case and that there is a special danger that explanations
based on juror unemployment, education, or income are pretextual,
the trial judge should make a dual inquiry. First, the judge should
determine whether the prosecutor's explanation is rationally related
to the existence of specific juror bias. Second, the judge should
consider whether the prosecutor has inquired into and shown during voir dire'the existence or possiblity of some specific bias, even
though that showing may be too slight to support a challenge for
cause. A sliding scale approach is advisable; the more tenuous the
relationship between the alleged motive and specific bias, the
301
greater must be the prosecutor's "showing" of potential bias.
that defendant's parents and other Baptist ministers from the Newark area would be
alibi and/or character witnesses, it may seem that he excluded Blacks and therefore
Baptists on the basis of valid trial-related reasons. But these alleged trial-related
reasons sweep so broadly as to attenuate their validity, for on these assumptions,
the exclusion of any and all Blacks living near Newark would be justifiable. If so,
"valid trial-related reasons" would become so broad as to approximate presumed
group bias itself, and so in this sense lack any real relation to the particular case on
trial-particularly where, as here, the State on voir dire made no attempt to determine, first, whether the black venirepersons were Baptists, and second, whether
they would be unduly swayed by the testimony of black Baptist ministers. At this
point, we can see that what made the reason seem to the assistant prosecutor a valid
trial-related reason in the first place is assumptions about Blacks and Baptists that
are quite unflattering, not to say invidiously discriminatory, to both the racial group
and the religious group.
The court's decision has foundation in Batson, where the Supreme Court expressly required the prosecutor's explanation of his use of peremptories to be "related to the
particular case to be tried." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
301 "Showing" does not mean that the prosecutor must, by some standard of proof,
establish specific bias. To so require would convert the peremptory challenge into a
challenge for cause. However, the prosecutor must at least inquire into, and bring out
facts or opinions on voir dire on which to base a reasonable assumption ofjuror bias, so
that the assumption is not being made on race alone, or on some other overbroad basis
which has a disparate impact on blacks.
Because voir dire and the attendant exclusion of jurors has concluded when the
Batson motion is raised and decided-it is only then that the judge has in front of her all
the evidence from which to determine the existence of a prima facie case-the approach
adopted in Brown and Gilmore, and recommended in this Article, places the prosecutor in

SERR AND MANEY

[Vol. 79

In sum, although Batson's requirement that the prosecutor provide a "racially-neutral" explanation does not require absolute racial neutrality, either on the face of the explanation or in its effect,
the term is not without meaning. It has evolved into a requirement
that the prosecutor's reasons be "legitimate"-that is, rationally related to the existence of specific juror bias or other recognized jury
selection concerns.
c.

Bona Fide

In addition to being specific and legitimate, the prosecutor's explanation must also be bona fide and not merely a pretext for racial
discrimination.3 0 2 This "hurdle" is closely related to the first two
because the less "specific" or "legitimate" the explanation (in other
words, the less rationally related the explanation is to the outcome
of the case or to the existence of juror bias), the greater the likelihood that it is a pretext for racial discrimination. Yet, the "bona
fide" requirement is a separate inquiry because the specificity and
legitimacy of the prosecutor's stated reasons do not preclude the
possibility that those stated reasons are not the true motivation behind his exercise of peremptories.
The possibility of pretext is especially apparent when the prosecutor's explanation is neither objectively verifiable nor directly related to specific juror bias. Examples include explanations based on
perceived juror disinterest, bewilderment, nervousness, indecisiveness, hostility, aversion to eye contact, and just plain "poor attitude," all of which courts have deemed capable of rebutting an
inference of intentional discrimination. The courts' acceptance of
such motives indicates that Batson did not destroy the "hunch" challenge.3 0 3 Trial judges should, however, carefully scrutinize pera bit of a quandary. Extensive inquiry during voir dire into specific bias, especially racelinked bias, may actually call attention to the racial issue and may support an inference
of intentional discrimination. On the other hand, failure to make such an inquiry on voir
dire raises the specter of a finding that the prosecutor exercised his strikes on the basis
of an overbroad and impermissible assumption.
This "quandary" is justifiable, however, because of the notion that peremptory challenges are precisely designed to remove those jurors whose suspected biases cannot be
established to the extent necessary to support a challenge for cause. Prosecutorial inquiry into the existence of specific bias, rather than merely striking because of broad
assumptions based on race, age, or status, actually promotes the accuracy of peremptory
challenges. Such inquiry, therefore, is desirable, especially when the "cost" of too little
inquiry may be hidden racial discrimination.
302 See, e.g., Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir. 1987); Clark, 645 F. Supp. at
898; Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 542-43, 511 A.2d at 1168; People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711,
720-21, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 661, 726 P.2d 102, 107 (1986).
303 See Gilmore, 103 NJ. at 538-39, 511 A.2d at 1166 (noting that "hunch" challenges
are viable under the various state constitutional analyses developed prior to Batson and
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emptories based on "hunches" and "seat-of-the-pants instincts,"
because such instincts easily disguise the broad assumptions of
30 4
group bias condemned in Batson.
Even explanations which are objectively verifiable are subject to
misuse. Peremptories exercised because of age, income, education,
or occupation are tenuously related to specific juror bias and are no
less subject to pretextual misuse than the aforementioned
"hunches." These explanations also deserve close scrutiny by trial
judges to ensure that they are bona fide.30 5 Under the analysis proposed in this Article to uncover pretext, the nature of the prosecutor's proffered justification should not only determine the level of
scrutiny, but should remain a factor in the trial judge's consideration of whether the alleged motive is bona fide or pretextual.
The prosecutor's facially legitimate reason is more likely a pretext for discrimination when he has not evenly applied his "peremptory policy" to blacks and whites alike. In Garrett v. Morris,30 6 the
prosecutor struck all three potential black jurors, allegedly on the
grounds that they lacked the background, education, and knowledge
necessary to understand scientific evidence the government planned
to introduce. Yet two of the three blacks had a high school degree,
and the other was only three hours short of a college business degree. Moreover, of the whites remaining on the jury, at least two
had never completed high school, and most of the others held only a
high school diploma. 30 7 Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor's explanation was a pretext for pur30 8
poseful discrimination.
which ostensibly mirror the Batson procedures). In Gilmore, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated: "A prosecutor may act freely on the basis of "hunches" unless and until
those acts create a prima fade case of group bias, and even then he may rebut the inference." Id. (citing People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 170, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77, 672 P.2d
854, 859 (1983).
304 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Gilmore, 103 NJ. at
538-39, 511 A.2d at 1166.
305 Even reasons directly related to specific juror bias and, therefore, related to the
outcome of the trial may, in some instances, be pretextual. The nature of the reason is
simply one factor which the trial judge should take into account in his determination of
whether the prosecutor's explanation is genuine. Moreover, the nature of the reason
should determine the trial judge's level of scrutiny for genuineness.
306 815 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1987).
307 Id. at 513-14.
308 Id at 514. The court stated: "The prosecutor's rationale-the blacks' purported
lack of education, background, and knowledge-seems clearly pretextual in light of his
decision not to strike white jurors who differed in no significant way."
The court also noted that the black jurors had no difficulty understanding or answering questions on voir dire, and none indicated any partiality toward defendant.
Moreover, at least one black woman seemed to have an attitude favorable to the prose-
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In Clark v. City of Bridgeport,30 9 the prosecutor struck a black juror from Bridgeport and explained that he preferred jurors who did
not reside in Bridgeport, although a white from Bridgeport remained on the jury. The prosecutor struck another black allegedly
because he belonged to an international organization of police
chiefs, a characteristic favorable to the government. 3 10 The court
ruled that the reasons for the exclusion of the two were
31
pretextual. '
The Supreme Court of New Jersey shed further light on the
pretext problem in State v. Gilmore.31 2 The prosecutor in Gilmore
claimed that he struck three black housewives and two black secretaries because he wanted intellectual types on thejury. 3 13 Not only
did the prosecutor fail to insist upon intellectual achievement by
white jurors, but the only issue for the jury to resolve was uncomplicated-identification of the perpetrator. 3 14 The court concluded
that the prosecutor's explanation was not bona fide, emphasizing
that there was no "reasonable relevancy" between the jury issue and
the prosecutor's preference for jurors of high intellectual
achievement. 3 15
The, court's rationale in Gilmore proposes an additional factor
relevant to determining whether the prosecutor's proffered motive
is a pretext for racial discrimination: Is the motive rationally related
to the trial? Logically, the less trial-related the explanation, the
more likely that it is a facially neutral reason manufactured to hide
the broad race-based assumptions condemned in Batson. Yet, courts
have rarely found explanations pretextual absent an uneven application to black and white jurors, no matter how tenuous the relationship between the explanations and the trial.3 16 This judicial
reluctance to find "pretext" is especially troubling when the prosecutor bases his peremptory challenges on one or more of the
"hunches" earlier described, such as juror indifference, nervousness, eye contact, and the like. Not only are these hunches the most
likely facade for intentional racial discrimination, but the "uneven
cution. Id. All these factors suggested that the prosecutor's proffered reason was
pretextual.
309 645 F. Supp. 890, 893 n.3 (D. Conn. 1986).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 898.
312 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986).

Id. at 1168.
Id. The prosecutor admitted that the state had strong case and that the issue to be
resolved-identification-was not very complicated.
313
314

315 Id.
316 Even the conclusion in Gilmore was based to a large extent on the racially uneven
application of the prosecutor's alleged policy for exercising peremptory strikes. See id.
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application" test of Garrett, Clark, and Gilmore is totally unresponsive
to such a "hunch" challenge. For example, even peremptories exercised on grounds as tenously related to the outcome of the trial as
age, low income, and lack of education are objectively verifiable in the
sense that a judge can identify these characteristics in blacks and
whites and decide whether the prosecutor has evenly applied his
proferred "peremptory policy" among the races. When the government strikes jurors because of poor attitude or indifference, however, it will be virtually impossible for the judge to determine
whether similarly situated whites have been challenged.3 17 These
"hunches" appear to be the perfect disguise for discrimination.
Since these "hunches" provide an excellent opportunity for discrimination, their relationship to valid trial concerns should be a
factor in determining whether the "hunch" is a pretext. Certainly,
juror indifference is a valid concern, though perhaps less so than
juror bias, but, as in the cases involving race-linked motives, the trial
court should require the prosecutor to expose this juror indifference
on voir dire, at least to a degree providing the trial court a basis for
3 18
judging the genuineness of the motive.
In sum, the "obstacles" the courts have set up to screen
prosecutorial motives are less obstacles to racial discrimination than
they are road maps. The ease with which a prosecutor may articulate motives sufficient to rebut any inference of intentional discrimination belies the magnitude of the problem which led to the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson. It is noteworthy that of the few
published opinions where the prosecutor failed to articulate acceptable reasons, virtually all involved the retroactive application of Batson to cases tried prior to the Supreme Court decision.3 1 9 This
317 Whichjurors have a "poor attitude"? Which are hostile? Were there other jurors
who exhibited a lack of eye contact during voir dire? It is very unlikely that a trial judge
can remember all the idiosyncracies exhibited by the prospective jurors during voir dire,
especially when the prosecutor gives his explanation, if at all, subsequent to the questioning of all venirepersons.
318 While juror hostility, indifference, and indecisiveness are valid trial-related concerns, it is apparent that these hunches are less rationally related to trial outcome than,
for example, juror bias. Moreover, the hunch is just that-a guess that a particular juror
is indecisive, nervous or hostile. Finally, because these characteristics are not easily
identifiable in jurors generally, it is difficult to show the disparate application of the
prosecutor's rationale. These observations call for some safeguard against the unbridled use of these "hunches" as a pretext for racial discrimination. Requiring a rational
relationship between the hunch and the trial, supported by voir dire, is one means available to trial judges to prevent discrimination from going undetected.
319 See United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987); Garrett v. Morris, 815
F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987). Compare Clark, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986).
In Clark, there is perhaps another valid reason why the prosecutor was unable to
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indicates that prosecutors selecting juries in awareness of Batson are
having few problems saying the right things when asked by trial
judges to explain their use of peremptories. Moreover, the tests
outlined by the reviewing courts, and presumably applied by trial
judges, pose virtually no obstacle to anything but blatant discrimination and may actually serve as a jury selection discrimination "howto" guide.
The consequences of this phenomenon are disturbing. The
delicate balance struck by Batson between the competing interests of
the peremptory character of the challenge and the prevention of racial discrimination in jury selection has been obliterated. Not only
has the prima facie case lost its meaning and the challenge its peremptory character, but no corresponding benefits, in the form of
curtailing racial discrimination, have been realized. In other words,
the courts' implementation of the Batson procedures, rather than
balancing the two competing interests, has severely infringed upon
one interest without advancing the other.
3.

Losing Sight of the Forest

The final command of Batson is one that the trial judges and
reviewing courts have largely ignored. After the prosecutor comes
foward with an explanation for peremptorily striking blacks, the
Supreme Court directed trial judges to "determine if the defendant
has established purposeful discrimination. ' 320 Articulation of "acceptable" prosecutorial motives, therefore, does not end the Batson
inquiry. Such an abridged inquiry is inconsistent with the express
language of Batson. The trial court should proceed to make the
ultimate determination of whether the defendant has established intentional discrimination, taking into consideration the relative
strength of the prosecutor's explanations. Although there is a spectrum of "acceptable" prosecutorial explanations, some are certainly
more acceptable than others-more specific, more neutral, more
genuine, or more rationally related to the case being tried. Whether
the government has rebutted an inference of intentional discrimination depends not upon the independent "acceptability" of the
articulate acceptable reasons. Although the trial in Clark occurred subsequent to Batson,
it was a civil trial-a civil rights suit brought by blacks against the City of Bridgeport,
whose attorney struck all the blacks from the jury. 645 F. Supp. at 891-92. The city
attorney was apparently aware of Batson, but he made no effort to hide his discriminatory
use of peremptories, failing to anticipate the Court's application of Batson to a civil case.
Id. at 892-93, 896. Thus, the situation in Clark is not significantly different from that in
Brown, Chalan, and Garrett and supports the proposition that any prosecutor aware of
Batson's application will have no trouble complying with it.
320 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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proferred explanations, but rather upon the totality of relevant circumstances, including the strength of the evidence which raised the
inference, the credibility of the prosecutor, and the nature of the
explanations viewed in their entirety. If a prosecutor strikes all the
blacks from the jury or otherwise conducts himself on voir dire so as
to raise a strong inference of intentional racial discrimination, it
should not be sufficient to merely explain each peremptory strike in
terms generally, and liberally, found "acceptable" by the courts,
such as "he was inattentive"; "she was hostile"; or "two others
didn't look me in the eye." Rather, it is the sum quality of all the
reasons that is relevant to the ultimate result. Furthermore, a trial
court should not disregard the evidence on which it based its initial
finding that the defendant established a prima facie case.
Essentially, upon the showing of a prima facie case, trial court
implementation of Batson procedures requires a two-step inquiry.
First, the trial judge should determine whether the prosecutor's
proffered reasons are "acceptable" according to the various tests
promulgated by the lower courts. 32 1 If not, the prosecutor's explanation is per se insufficient to rebut the previously raised inference
of intentional discrimination, and the defendant wins.3 2 2 Second,

provided that each of the prosecutor's explanations is "acceptable,"
the trial court still must determine whether, considering the totality
of the relevant circumstances, the defendant has ultimately proved
intentional discrimination. Relevant circumstances include an assessment of the degree of "acceptability" of the prosecutor's explanations viewed in toto, 32 3 the strength of the evidence supporting
321 In other words, are the prosecutor's reasons sufficiently specific, trial-related, and
bona fide?
322 When the defendant has proven intentional racial discrimination, the trial judge
must, of course, employ a remedy. The remedy chosen may depend upon the particular
jury selection procedure used by that court. In jurisdictions using the jury box system,
where prospective jurors are seated, examined, and challenged or accepted one at a
time, the appropriate remedy should be to impanel a fresh venire and start over from
scratch. Reseating a previously removed juror is not advisable because that juror may
have developed a bias against the lawyer who originally excluded him.
On the other hand, in jurisdictions which use a struck jury system, where the names
of all prospective jurors are transcribed on a list, and both parties literally strike as many
names as they have peremptories with the result being a jury of the first twelve commonly acceptable veniremen, a court may properly implement the other remedy mentioned in Batson, and simply disallow the discriminatory strikes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at
99-100 n.24. Because in the struck jury system the judge can decide the Batson motion
without revealing to any juror whether they have been challenged and by whom, any
jurors discriminated against can be seated on the jury without the danger of prejudice
against the prosecutor.
323 Trial courts should closely scrutinize those reasons which are the most likely disguise for racial discrimination, such as the "hunch" reasons like "poor attitude," and the
reasons having a disparate impact on blacks. See Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 897 (stating that
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the initial inference of intentional discrimination, 32 4 the credibility
of the prosecutor, 32 5 the apparent lack of any trial-related benefit
derived by engaging in discrimination, 3 26 and the prosecutor's repu327
tation, or lack thereof, for discriminating in previous trials.
In sum, focusing solely on the prosecutor's proferred explanation, even though "acceptable" under the current tests, is a perversion of the Batson procedures. This approach actually facilitates
racial discrimination given the apparent ease with which a prosecutor may articulate reasons "acceptable" to courts. If Batson is to
have any preventive effect at all, courts must more closely scrutinize
not only the explanations themselves, but also all the other factors
relevant to Batson's ultimate question of whether the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination.
III.

CONCLUSION

The inescapable first impression drawn from the Batson jurisprudence is failure. The Supreme Court's "middle-ground" remedy, which attempted to eliminate discriminatory jury selection
while at the same time preserving the common law institution of
peremptory challenge, has thus far disserved both interests. Racism
can still pervert jury selection, and prosecutorial explanation has
bastardized the peremptory challenge. From all indications, courts
have uniformly ignored or diluted the prima facie showing, which is
the sole Batson element preserving the peremptory nature of the
challenge. The cost of forfeiting truly peremptory challenges has
proof of disproportionate impact is a factor bearing on the existence of intentional
discrimination).
324 The "numbers games," which were relevant to the existence of an inference of
purposeful discrimination, are also relevant to the trial court's ultimate finding. See
Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1011 n.7; Woods, 812 F.2d at 1487.
325 Matthews, 803 F.2d at 332. The court in Matthews stated: "[Tihe [trial] court noted
that the demeanor of the prosecutor while exercising her peremptory challenges and the
time that she took in so doing indicated that she was not simply striking veniremen
because they were black but was engaging in a careful process of deliberation based on
many factors." Id.
326 See id. (suggesting there was no prosecutorial advantage to keeping blacks off the
jury because the key witnesses for both sides were black); Ricks v. State, No. 6, Div. 45,
slip op. (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 1987)(LEXIS, States library)(prosecutor argued that
his witnesses were black, and opinion implicitly suggests that this factor is at least
relevant).
327 See Matthews, 803 F.2d at 332 ("The [trial] court noted that there was no evidence
that the prosecution had maintained a pattern or practice of striking blacks from juries
in cases where the defendants are black, and further commented that the court's personal experience showed the contrary."). Thus, Swain's pattern of minority exclusion in
case after case is no longer necessary to prove an equal protection violation, but it is still
a relevant factor.

1988]

RACISM & PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

yielded little corresponding benefit, as a myriad of "acceptable" explanations and excuses cloud any hope of detecting racially based
motivations. With the apparent acquiesence of the courts, prosecutors should have little trouble articulating acceptable reasons,
whatever their underlying motivation. If the balance struck in Batson
is inherently counterproductive, the Supreme Court must eventually
choose between two competing interests, either eliminating the peremptory challenge, as Justice Marshall suggested, or returning to
Swain v. Alabama. It is still too early, however, to judge Batson a total
failure. The interests it attempts to serve are too important. Batson
may yet survive if the implementing courts, in which the Supreme
Court expressed great confidence and vested such wide discretion,
are sensitive to its subtle balance and ultimate purposes-creating a
jury of peers, ensuring minority participation in the criminal jury's
direction of society, and building public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
First, trial courts should put teeth into the Batson prima facie
case requirement. Otherwise, Chief Justice Burger's fears for the
peremptory challenge will be substantiated. Courts, therefore, must
strictly define "inference." Finding an inference of discrimination
and forcing prosecutorial explanation every time a defendant raises
a Batson challenge upsets the delicate balance by defeating the peremptory nature of the challenge. Such a lax interpretation of "inference" is patently inconsistent with the respective burdens placed on
defendant and prosecutor in Batson. Upon defendant's raising an
inference of intentional discrimination, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to explain the strikes and to rebut that inference. The
obvious implication is that a prosecutor who fails to explain his peremptory challenges loses the Batson issue-that is, the defendant has
proven intentional discrimination. Thus, the Batson inference is a
rebuttable presumption. The presumption disappears upon an acceptable prosecutorial explanation, and the trial court must then
make the ultimate determination of whether the defendant has
proven intentional discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the defendant. Therefore, raising an
inference does not, and cannot, mean that the defendant is required
only to introduce a quantum of evidence sufficient to raise the Batson
issue. Rather, "inference" suggests evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Otherwise, there is no need and, given the
importance of the peremptory challenge, no justification for requiring the prosecutor to explain his challenge. This threshold is obvi-
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ously much higher than that which the lower courts have so far
imposed.
Although the prima facie case requirement protects the peremptory nature of the challenge, it does not serve Batson's primary
goal of eliminating racist jury selection. Without scrutiny sufficient
to detect racial discrimination, the protection offered by Batson is
too insignificant to warrant interference with the state's interests in
freely exercising peremptories. Courts disserve both of Batson's
competing interests if they force prosecutors to explain any strike of
a venireperson who shares the defendant's race and then accept virtually any proferred explanation. Yet, the prosecutor's explanation
must be the focal point ofjudicial scrutiny if Batson's protections are
to have any meaning at all. Trial courts can best effectuate these
protections by utilizing the dual inquiry recommended in this Article. First, do the prosecutor's proffered motives rebut the prima facie case, creating a fact question of purposeful discrimination?
Second, if so, after a review of all the evidence, including the facts
raising the inference and the sum quality of the prosecutor's explanations, has the defendant ultimately proven purposeful
discrimination.
Rebutting the prima facie case involves an independent assessment of each of the prosecutor's explanations: 1) is it specific?; 2) is
it rationally related to juror bias or other characteristics affecting
juror qualification; and 3) is it bona fide? If each of the prosecutor's
explanations passes these requirements, a fact question results.
One insufficiently explained strike establishes a case of discrimination. As the Batson Court explained, the equal protection clause
prohibits discrimination against even a single juror.
A satisfactory rebuttal of the prima facie case does not end the
inquiry. After the presumption disappears, there remains the ultimate determination of whether the defendant has proven intentional racial discrimination. In making this ruling, the trial court
should carefully consider all relevant circumstances, including the
strength of the evidence which initially raised the inference and especially the nature of the prosecutor's explanations viewed in toto.
This Article outlines three broad categories of prosecutorial explanations: 1) objectively verifiable and directly related to specific juror
bias or ineffectiveness; 2) objectively verifiable but tenuously related
to specific juror bias or ineffectiveness; and 3) primarily subjective
challenges or "hunches". The more subjective the explanation and
the more tenuously related to juror bias or qualification, the more
suspect is the prosecutor's entire scheme ofjury selection. Thus, in
making the ultimate determination of whether the defendant has
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proved racial discrimination, the trial court should consider the sum
quality of all the prosecutor's proffered explanations. "Hunches"
weigh less in the totality of circumstances than do objectively verifiable reasons strongly connected to the existence of specific juror
bias. The more jurors that are challenged on "hunches," even "acceptable" hunches, the stronger becomes the defendant's case for a
finding of intentional discrimination.
If Batson is to work and attain a point of equilibrium which maximizes the competing interests of equal protection, the peremptory
challenge, and the democratic jury, its success depends on the trial
judges in whom the Supreme Court has vested such wide discretion.
At present, Batson is not working, but this Article proposes that it
can, at least to the degree that any "middle ground" remedy can.
Perhaps, however, further jurisprudential experience will show that
Batson's attempt at the improbable was actually an attempt at the
impossible. If that happens, the Supreme Court will eventually have
to sacrifice one of two important interests. For now, it is still too
soon to force such a choice. A more exacting effort to implement
Batson's subtle balance is required of courts that are sensitive to its
history, its competing interests, its express procedures, and its worthy goals.

